By James Pellitteri
On July 17, 2018, at 1600 hours, the Gurnee (IL) Fire Department responded to a structure fire at 39721 Dilleys Road, aka the Pyramid House. The Pyramid House was built in 1979 as a private and public museum. It is a five-story structure; floors two through five were of Type V wood-frame construction with wooden floors. The first floor was Type II construction with concrete walls and flooring. On the third and fourth floors, the pyramid’s exterior stucco surface was covered with plastic sheeting by construction workers. The best way to describe the structure is as five square floors cascading from larger to smaller from the first to the fifth floor. The pyramid is basically a tent built around the square structure, providing many void spaces that run vertically from the first floor to the fifth floor—balloon construction, if you will.
More Tim Olk Photos: Fire at IL ‘Pyramid’ Presents Challenges to Firefighters
The still response is three engines [the third engine is the automatic response area company, the Newport (IL) Fire Department]; one truck; two rescues; and one battalion. En route, we received a message that an elderly, handicapped man was trapped on the third floor. We upgraded to a working still, which changed quarter companies and provided one additional engine, two chiefs, notification of the utility companies, the Fire Prevention Bureau, and a general alarm. I was the incident commander.
(1) The Pyramid on arrival. (Photos by Tim Olk.)
(2) Staging at the second alarm.
Building Access
The pyramid is on the farthest north end of our district. There are no hydrants and remote access around the structure. It is surrounded by a moat and a single lightweight bridge that cannot support fire apparatus. However, a rock/gravel narrow service road with a concrete fence runs on the onside of the road on the other side of the moat. The property has a large parking lot for events west of the pyramid; this lot was great for staging and rehab.
The property is secured by a concrete fence and an electrical gate at the main entrance to the complex. The electrical gate delayed access: Our first engine on location had to manually override the gate.
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Initial Actions
The first-due Engine 1311 parked just short of the lightweight bridge and started a search and rescue on the third and fourth floors. During the search, Engine 1311 members had oriented themselves by line of sight. Conditions rapidly changed on the fourth floor. Engine 1311’s company got separated and could not locate the stairwell to egress the building. Note: There was one unprotected stairwell from the second floor to the fifth floor. Engine 1311 just went on air, and conditions on the inside were clear at first with light smoke and no heat or fire. Then smoke conditions went to zero visibility; there still was no heat or fire. Engine 1311 now was separated and lost on the fourth floor.
A Mayday was called. A rapid intervention team (RIT) had not yet been established. Engine 1312 was on location and on the first floor deploying a line. Engine 1312 then was deployed to the Mayday to rescue Engine 1311. Engine 1312 radioed that they knew where Engine 1311 was. Engine 1312 quickly deployed and rescued Engine 1311 without incident. All companies exited the building and completed a personnel accountability report (PAR).
Construction workers on site rescued the elderly gentleman. As Engine 1311 was entering the building, however, they received a report that workers were still in the building. They proceeded with the primary rescue assignment.
Suppression
The primary pumping engine was 1311. The engineer of Engine 1311 did an excellent job of maintaining water. Engine 1311 flowed one line until positive water was established with drafting. The engineer set up supply lines to take tank water to other engines until the Newport engine established drafting operations from the moat that supplied Engine 1311.
(3) Hydraulic lifts used in construction were used for firefighting.
(4) This backdraft took place as the interior crews were evacuating.
(5) This Bristol (IL) Fire Department ladder truck was able to access the small service road to the north of the pyramid.
Hoselines, along with interior hoselines, were now deployed to the exterior A and B sides. The exterior hoselines were 2½-inch handlines with straight tip at 250 gallons per minute (gpm). Three-inch hoselines supplied a ground monitor at 500 gpm, and three-inch hoselines were wyed to multiple 1¾-inch hoselines with combination nozzles at 150 gpm each. The ground monitor was on the A side exterior. The 2½-inch hoseline was on the B side exterior. Two construction hydraulic lifts close to the building were commandeered for elevation/platforms of the 1¾-inch handlines to get direct penetration on the fire from the exterior on the third and fourth floors. Ground ladders could not be used because of the angle of the pyramid. The two hydraulic construction lifts were staffed with two firefighters and a construction worker each and could reach as high as the fourth floor.
Changing Conditions and Order to Evacuate
Three companies and a division chief were now deployed to the third and fourth floors. These companies were assigned to look for fire in the void spaces of the exterior walls from the interior. This was a coordinated attack with exterior companies. Division A and Division B chiefs were assigned to the exterior. The interior companies were made up of a Gurnee engine and truck, a Beach Park (IL) Fire Department engine, and a Zion (IL) Fire-Rescue deputy chief. Conditions had changed on the exterior. I radioed this change to the interior division chief. He confirmed my radio traffic and felt companies on the interior were okay.
The lieutenant of Gurnee Engine 1311 advised me that based on his assessment the building should be evacuated. I radioed this information back to the interior division chief. The division chief acknowledged the evacuation order, and the interior companies were ordered to evacuate the building with PAR before the division chief finished his radio traffic.
The lieutenant of Gurnee Engine 1311 radioed, “We all need to leave now!” Again, the order to evacuate was given. Companies started to evacuate. There was discussion about whether to bring the interior hoseline out. It was decided to leave it behind, which was the correct action, but the discussion delayed the evacuation.
During this event, conditions on the exterior started to change. I radioed several updates about the exterior. When conditions started to change, the electrical company had just cut the power. We did not know that a ventilation fan was at the top of the structure effectively venting the fire, heat, and smoke, moving products of combustion out of the void spaces. When the power was cut, smoke, heat, and fire just stayed in the void spaces, especially at the third and fourth floors. Then an exterior company on the B side removed a large heavy-duty plastic covering from the exterior wall/roof on the third and fourth floors, which introduced oxygen to the fire that was starving for oxygen. A major backdraft occurred.
Mayday!
The interior crews were making their way out within seconds after the backdraft had taken place. Gurnee Truck 1331 called a Mayday! My heart sank. I said a quick prayer, “Lord, don’t take my men today.” The companies were separated and blown off their feet. Mayday procedures were followed. All companies self-rescued and quickly exited the building with PAR.
The interior crews have their own stories to tell of what took place in the interior at the time leading up to the backdraft. In the end, the fire went out with a small single-axle ladder truck from the Bristol (IL) Fire Department that could access the small service road to the north. We flooded the structure with water. All companies worked tirelessly throughout the night. The last companies left around 1200 hours.
Lessons Learned and Reinforced
- Working with departments you do not work with often can be challenging and rewarding.
- Assign the proper number of RIT companies to support interior operations.
- Interior crews must maintain orientation beyond the line of sight and not count on thermal imaging cameras.
- Have the proper number of fireground radios in the command unit.
- Know your firefighters’ strengths and weaknesses. Commanders must train with their teams to have confidence in them on the fireground. Training and preplanning are invaluable. We as a department recently participated in tactical and preplan training at this facility.
This article is dedicated to the firefighters and officers with whom I serve and the responding companies that assisted the Gurnee Fire Department at this incident. During the incident, we had two Maydays and six firefighters were transported to the hospital for minor injuries.
James Pellitteri is a battalion chief with the Gurnee (IL) Fire Department, where he has worked for 29 years. He is a shift commander and was the training/safety officer for 13 years. He has served in leadership roles for the Lake & McHenry County Technical Rescue Team, USAR, dive, and swiftwater teams.
