Lessons Learned from Years of Industrial Responses

Fire departments must preplan for incidents and know the buildings, chemicals, and processes in their response area that can cause significant problems. Experience, training, and continuing education allow firefighters and incident commanders to “know the enemy and survive.” Yet, despite all this effort, there is no guarantee that responders will be safe. Sometimes, the hazards on the fireground are not visible; sometimes, the hazards may not be part of our experiences and almost impossible to imagine. Like many others, I follow line-of-duty deaths (LODDs) so we can honor those who made the ultimate sacrifice and prevent other firefighters from being injured or killed in the same circumstances. Near misses also provide lessons learned. This article relates fireground experiences that sound like war stories. Each contains a lesson from which we all can learn.

Sea Can or Intermodal Container

The Enderby (B.C., Canada) Volunteer Fire Department responded to a fire in a facility that manufactured log homes. Although the fire was under control for the duration of the fire, the facility was a total loss. A nearby sea can (intermodal) container, which firefighters had checked for heat several times, exploded. Volunteer Firefighter Daniel Botkin, who was involved in overhaul, was killed. The container held several gasoline-powered chain saws. The firefighters operating near or on the container did not observe or feel any excessive heating from the container.

What happened? The external heating caused a small amount of fuel from the chain saws to vaporize and ignite, causing an explosion. Botkin was nearby and was struck by one of the doors from the sea can. He succumbed to his injuries.

Fire in Industrial Facility in Which I Work

A similar type of sea can was involved in a fire on our own industrial property. I investigated the fire days later, since I was on bereavement leave at the time of the fire. I observed fire patterns on the outside of the sea can that indicated the fire’s area of origin. A 20-lb. liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tank had been venting as it was being heated by the fire. Additionally, a pallet of oxidizers was stored inside the container. The sea can was near an air intake about 15 feet from a large building housing an electrolytic process.

On arrival, our fire crews had been told that no hazardous materials were stored in the sea can. Shutting down the air intake of the building in the immediate vicinity would have caused hydrogen to build up, complicating matters. The fire was extinguished successfully, and no firefighters were injured.

We learned that sea cans/containers can act as pressure vessels. We made our firefighters aware of this potential hazard and also reviewed the LODD report on the incident involving Botkin.

Electrical—High Energy

As firefighters, we know that we can apply a broken stream to a residential transformer fire and that we can usually expect to deal with electricity on our fire calls. In an industrial setting, often, very high-voltage electricity is present. One of the three conductors from our hydroelectric generating station came apart after stress from weather and a collection of ice slivers that spliced the line.

Our industrial facility uses the hydroelectric power of a small city. Voltage rectifiers and transformers are sealed in a vacuum state. Loss of that seal promotes production of acetylene, a flammable gas. Blast walls between the transformers and the rectifiers are there for a reason. In our environment during very cold spells, signs indicating “110,000 volts” are posted on insulators in the substation yard. Because of contamination and ice buildup, there is a greater danger that the energy will jump these insulators and go to ground.

Another potential hazard in this area is arc flash. It is not likely that our firefighters will operate in these areas unless we will have to make a rescue.

Knowing that information increased the safety of firefighters who may have to enter that area—for example, I enter that area during fire safety inspections.

Pressure Vessels

Many of the significant calls or explosions industrial firefighters respond to result from the failure of a pressure vessel. Autoclaves are like giant pressure vessels. At our facility, they used to add molten sulphur, special reagents, and oxygen to process zinc in a zinc pressure leach process. This normally is a safe procedure when all process steps are taken. One day, we were dispatched to this autoclave because a valve had been blown clean off the bottom of the vessel, perhaps as a result of operator error. We learned later that molten sulphur and oxygen were added but that the reagent that was the mixing medium was inadvertently missed.

Other similar incidents involved an eight-inch air line. For whatever reason, this air line exploded twice in the same location. It was thought that methyl hydrate had been added during the winter months to prevent the line from freezing. The first time the line exploded, shrapnel from the pipe was sent flying everywhere and one piece struck the building in which I was. Months later in the spring, a piece of shrapnel was found about 500 feet away in an attic in an apartment building when the roof started to leak.

Chemicals

Industrial facilities often have a huge array of chemicals, which often necessitates that trained hazmat technician teams respond to incidents. Chemicals in bulk at the facility include bulk liquid oxygen, sulphur acid, and chlorine. The facility also has had hydrogen fires and explosions, and molten sulphur and the associated sulphur dust presented challenges to our teams.

We have responded to major propane leaks. On one call, the temperature was –42°F, so the leaking propane pooled as a liquid on the ground. We had the employees shelter in place. I was called to explain why I didn’t order an evacuation. My response was that the conditions at the time allowed for a shelter in place, since the vapors being released were drifting to a lower elevation away from the main facility.

However, as we know, chemicals do not have to be spilled in large amounts to pose a risk. One day, while thumbing through the Canadian Emergency Response Guide, I observed how dangerous xylene is. I thought to myself, “That looks like a nasty one to deal with, and I am glad we do not have to deal with it.” Later that shift, I found an unattended 45-gallon drum of xylene in the middle of a shop floor. I found the barrel accidentally while on a fire safety tour and was surprised to learn that we used this chemical. The chemical tank was not labeled. This illustrates how important preplanning is.

Explosives

Because our facility is remote, we sometimes must deal with explosives. An incident to which we were dispatched involved an explosives delivery truck hitting the ditch and rolling over on its side. A police officer reported the accident. Fortunately, the explosives truck was carrying cubes of emulsion explosives 1.3 Division, which was stable unless the truck was carrying blasting caps or caught fire.

We dispatched a limited response of our senior members. To clean up the spilled explosives, we neutralized the emulsion with a liquid detergent, per the manufacturer’s recommendations. With a couple of very talented riggers, we uprighted the truck on its wheels.

Superheated Steam Mains

Our facility used steam to heat buildings and for mineral processing. Our members also performed inspections, testing, and maintenance of water-based fire protection systems (sprinkler systems). For several years, to access one of our sprinkler systems, we had to crawl in among the pipes in the steam tunnel and stand on a high-pressure heated steam main to operate a two-inch drain to simulate an operating sprinkler head. The problem was that when we opened the two-inch drain, the ice-cold water ran straight onto the steam main. Each time we did a “flow test,” we would come away with melted soles on our boots or a little steam burn as a souvenir.

Fortunately, a childhood friend who was a steam pipefitter observed my doing this test. He explained that if there were a hole in the steam main, I would be cut in half. With the stress and shock we were putting on that high-pressure steam main, it was a miracle it did not rupture.

Displaced Oxygen in Tanks

You would think that in a bulk liquid oxygen-producing facility, there would be no shortage of oxygen. Oxygen-enriched atmospheres support combustion and come with special hazards of their own. Special precautions must be taken when dealing with incidents producing or using oxygen that could produce an oxygen-enriched atmosphere.

While servicing that equipment, workers noticed things were not right while working inside a tank in this oxygen plant. We learned that nitrogen had displaced the normal ambient oxygen. Bulk liquid-producing plants also use refrigerant gas. Refrigerant gas (e.g., R22) and gases found in commercial coolers are more environmentally friendly now, but at a cost. When these refrigerant gases break down in fire conditions, they are deadlier: They can produce phosgene gas and hydrochloric acid vapors. There have been reports of firefighters being overcome from the leftover vapors from the refrigerant gas from the coolers while overhauling a grocery store that had been totally destroyed.

Explosions—IEDs

Our department has responded to about a dozen explosions resulting from hydrogen igniting, pipelines exploding, or failed pressure vessels. In one major incident, an explosion or a series of explosions involved a molten metal furnace that was approximately 5,000 square feet. I was first on scene of a mass-casualty incident. After this incident, I experienced and was diagnosed with critical post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

Over the years, we had responded to calls for this furnace when there were molten metal runaways. During the runaways, the temperature of the molten metal sometimes melted a hole in the bricks lining the furnace. We were called to control the chaos and the molten metal so it would not travel any distance and cause other problems. I recall hosing down the edges of the molten metal as it traveled like a volcano lava flow. Visibility was limited because of the smoke, steam, and black dust produced from the mini explosions. While on the nozzle at the time, I thought, “We must be winning because nobody is running away.” But, I was concerned that the concrete floor might not withstand the extreme temperature onslaught.

I did not find out until recently that the cement floors on which we were operating were not withstanding the extreme heat from the molten metal (about 2,800°F). The cement was exploding through the molten metal in a process called “spalling.” Once we cooled the top layer, we advanced on the crust we created. Singed turnout gear was not uncommon then. What we did not know was that when you singe your turnout gear, you have surpassed the temperature at which your self-contained breathing apparatus face piece fails.

We also were dispatched to a report of blasting caps found hidden on an electrical cable tray. It was not uncommon for the public or an employee to call asking us to remove or transfer explosives that had been “found.” In one incident, a police officer brought us some explosives to “disarm.” He asked that we go out to his cruiser to see what he had. Looking into the cruiser, we saw lying in front of his mobile radio a homemade improvised explosive device (IED) complete with installed blasting caps. In a heartbeat, I knew I was just too close. We called an expert to disarm the IED. It was a bit tense until that patrol car left.

Unconventional Medical Response

Responding to medical calls can be very interesting in an industrial facility. We soon learned never to trust the information the caller gives and not to minimize the report. Because of denial and an inexperienced dispatcher, a possible diabetic medical call began to sour. The caller was arguing with the dispatcher, insisting that he did not want an ambulance. From experience gained from previous medical calls, we knew that time was critical when responding to a medical call. We did not call the ambulance. My colleague and I responded in our vehicle at the time. Frustration set in as intuition told me this patient was in trouble. Intuition proved right. The patient was carried out. He was diabetic and barely conscious. We had to get him to the nearby hospital emergency department stat. I had a lollipop in my pocket, as it was Halloween. My colleague put the patient in a bear hug in the back seat. I asked my colleague to pull the patient’s head back. I stuck the lollipop in the patient’s mouth and had my colleague push his head forward so he would bite down on the pop. We rolled like that to the emergency department about three minutes away. The head nurse called me later saying, “Brad, you will never read that in a textbook, but that was nice work; his lights came back on shortly after you dropped him off.”

Conveyor Fires

Conveyor fires can act much like fires in a tunnel (“tunnel effect”). We were called to one conveyor fire many times, and I expected that we would soon arrive to one that would be beyond our control. To prevent this, we recommended that two sprinkler systems be installed, which was met with stiff resistance because of budget constraints. At one report of fire, we ran in with “the can” because a supervisor could smell something burning. Since I was unrelenting, I made several enemies trying to prevent that big fire. A year later while I was away on vacation, that conveyor way (above) caught fire. It was designed with combustible wood and the conveyor carried feed that had a high sulphur content. Also, the bottom of the conveyor way had large open windows that created a chimney effect. It was a huge fire that necessitated mutual-aid assistance. It nearly shut down the facility. Damages were reported to be more than $7 million. Luckily, no firefighter was injured while battling that fire.

Author’s note: Thanks to FCABC and Don Delcourt for their detailed white paper report on the LODD of Volunteer Firefighter Daniel Botkin, Enderby (B.C.) Fire Department.


BRADLEY ROY DAVIDSON, CFEI CFII, is a member of the HudBay Fire Department in Flin Flon, Manitoba, Canada. He has 37 years of experience in firefighting, education, and training involving municipal and industrial fires and emergencies. His recent accomplishments include a Honeywell DuPont Kevlar Scholarship at FDIC; he returned the following year as an FDIC International instructor. His most recent scholarship award was the Alan Brunacini Lifelong Learner Scholarship award from the International Society of Fire Service Instructors.

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