Many deaths can be eliminated if fire service leaders provide a voice in supporting construction codes in favor of automatic fire suppression systems.
According to the National Fire Protection Association, fire deaths rose 13 percent in the United States during the year 2000. Nationwide, there is a fatal fire every 130 minutes, and a full generation of firefighters have served this country since the original version of America Burning was published. Unfortunately, large and small communities are losing the battle for fire safety.
Each year nearly 4,000 Americans lose their lives in fire. Some are neighbors and some are co-workers. Fortunately, there is a sensible solution that can change this statistic. Improved sprinkler technology has increased the odds of survival by active intervention during the incipient stage of a fire. In the upcoming years, many deaths can be eliminated if fire service leaders provide a voice in supporting construction codes in favor of automatic fire suppression systems.
Forty years ago, newly elected President John F. Kennedy stated in his inaugural speech that the “torch was passed to a new generation.” First responders must internalize this timeless message and share what they have learned with architects, developers, shopkeepers, and elected officials to create a fire safe community.
INDIANA HOUSE FIRE
 Firefighters faced many operational challenges at the Indiana House fire. (1) The mixed stone and brick construction indicated renovations and the presence of possible void spaces. (Photo by author.) |
A grim reminder of rapid fire and smoke spread occurred on April 13, 2001, in Philadelphia at the Indiana House, an unlicensed boarding house without emergency life safety systems. It was a tragic day, and the lessons learned from large life-loss fires in renovated structures were thrust into the spotlight. Sadly, this incident had many similarities to the December 22, 1999, residential structure in Keokuk, Iowa, where three children and three firefighters were killed. Both fires occurred in properties that had been converted from homes to multiple occupancies. Both properties lacked working smoke detectors and an enclosed stairway. Such remodeling flaws vividly demonstrate that a system for reviewing restoration plans and continual inspections by the authority having jurisdiction are necessary for the protection of the general public and emergency responders.
At 6:39 a.m. on an overcast and humid morning, an alarm was transmitted for a fire at 2127 West Indiana Avenue in Philadelphia. Within moments, the assignment was upgraded to a full one-alarm deployment consisting of four engines, two ladders, two battalion chiefs, and a medic unit. As the on-duty deputy chief, I knew from the sound of the dispatcher’s voice that this was not going to be a routine response.
 (2) Narrow access to the rear yard made it difficult to raise portable ladders on side B. (Photo by author.) |
Within four minutes, the initial incident commander (IC)-a battalion chief-arrived on the scene. After establishing command, he directed units into the front and rear of the burning three-story, brick and stone, semiattached, 25-foot 2 75-foot structure. With heavy fire on the first floor and occupants trapped, we had limited operational options. An aggressive attack was clearly the correct course of action. Command established critical sectors inside and outside the structure. The first engine company positioned for an offensive assault. The IC directed a ladder company to vertically ventilate from the roof. He strategically deployed other units to address rescue before exposure protection. Suppression and ventilation duties were coordinated in an effort to reach the occupants. Rescuers quickly found a young girl in the kitchen on the first floor. A firefighter removed her to the exterior to awaiting paramedics, who immediately initiated medical care. She lacked vital signs, and responders had to initiate resuscitation procedures. Their lifesaving efforts continued during transport to the nearest hospital. Once in the hospital, the child began to breathe.
On my arrival on the fireground, I felt some brief hope that the situation could rapidly improve and then despair on hearing radio transmissions from key sectors. During the transfer of command procedure, I listened as the first-in battalion commander explained the gravity of the predicament. During initial size-up, the smoke was so thick that firefighters had a difficult time pinpointing the exact property. Status reports indicated that each floor was divided into many small rooms. A large concealed space existed in the ceiling on the first floor, and cheap laminated paneling covered walls and ceilings. Poke-through construction was allowing smoke to spread in the void spaces, and the combustible kerosene heater fuel was intensifying the flames. To make matters worse, occupant notification was delayed because no early warning devices sounded. This made self-evacuation from the upper floors impossible.
Immediately on assuming command, I reassigned the first-due battalion chief to the Interior Sector. From the command post, I saw how the first-due pumper had allowed adequate space in front of the property to operate effectively. The first-in company found a reliable water supply by connecting to a hydrant and stretched a 13/4-inch hoseline to the front porch. I watched as the battalion chief aide charted the exact position of companies and created a timeline of orders on a tactical worksheet. The aide informed me of how the heat met the fire attack team at the front door. I learned how extinguishment and advancement were slowed because of the fire’s intensity, how for a short time it seemed that the flames were overwhelming the handheld hose stream, how a second company stretched and staffed an additional mobile attack line, and how two “fully staffed” crews (three members on each 13/4-inch water line) were needed to provide the necessary gallons per minute to advance inside the structure.
Once inside, the companies located the interior wooden stairs and positioned the streams to drive the flames away from the open stairshaft. Members positioned a third hoseline on the rear fire escape. After gaining access, the hose team ascended to the second level and began to extinguish fire extending from the concealed spaces in the walls, floors, and ceilings.
 (3) Plastic used to cover the windows to protect occupants from cold weather held toxic gases inside the structure. (Photo by Diane Dus.) |
As the IC, I watched for strict point-of-entry control, our foundation for personnel accountability. I waited to see some improvement. I listened for status reports from inside the 28-bedroom structure. Engine companies were advancing. Ladder companies were effective in entry and ventilation. The search and rescue group was having trouble completing its primary task. Then a bleak message was transmitted: The Interior Sector reported that there were multiple fire fatalities-all adults-and a secondary search would be time-consuming because of the many “debris-strewn” rooms.
After just 19 minutes, members placed the fire under control and began the work of recovering bodies. Later, I saw the one body found on the first floor still in bed, four corpses on the second floor, and a deceased male within feet of the rear metal fire door on the top floor. Of the 11 residents inside the structure at the time of the fire, four were homeless, seven were dead, and a child was hospitalized with a very poor prognosis. Smoke and flames had taken their toll. The victims were old and young, disabled and able-bodied. The toxic gases took theirs lives in the same asphyxiating manner. Once again, the home-a place where most feel safest-had become an instrument of death, physical injury, and emotional pain. In this particular case, the extensive alterations and “plastic-covered” windows intended to im-prove the quality of life resulted in the lethal conditions inside the property. The electrical system that provided energy for normal living failed and caused the accidental fire.
Unfortunately, three days after the fire, the 11-year-old child rescued by firefighters lost her fight for life.
TIME FOR PREVENTION
Within 72 hours following the incident, the local media provided coverage of the Philadelphia Fire Department’s post-fire fatality program. Representatives from the Fire Prevention Division joined the first-due engine and ladder company in visiting the homes in a two-block radius of the fire scene. Firefighters went door to door installing smoke detectors and distributing pamphlets on home fire drills. This type of risk reduction program is extremely beneficial in the short term because the community is receptive to a fire safety message. However, this type of “one-time” educational endeavor is not enough because the emotional impact fades before long-term behavioral changes can take place. The Philadelphia Fire Department has found that the best way to change human behavior is by continuous community involvement.
After years of responding and reviewing fire death patterns, I feel the fire service is due for an attitude change. We need a greater emphasis on fire prevention, a greater commitment to code enforcement and regular company level inspections, continuous public education, research into fire safe building design, and serious involvement in developing life safety legislation.
The thought of attempting to influence public policy can instill fear in most seasoned firefighters. The idea of entering the political arena is filled with uncertainty and risk. This topic will be a burning issue in any size or type of department; yet, in reality, for too long good ideas and strong beliefs have not been effective.
It has been more than 25 years since the National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control, in its report America Burning, identified fire and fire deaths as a problem in big cities like New York and Philadelphia and small towns like Keokuk. It is a national problem that requires labor and management, line and staff, and career and volunteer personnel to work together to create a feasible solution. Fire chiefs can no longer refrain from fire code revisions or reduce resources in prevention bureaus; they must properly fund and evaluate programs. All new construction and renovation projects should have a formal review process. Front-line firefighters must be involved because they are stakeholders in quality prevention programs. Unfortunately, in our society there are few strong rallying points for the fire fatality problem. Certainly, the loss of eight civilians at the Indiana House can be the incentive for active involvement in the upcoming years.
To break this “life-threatening” cycle to civilians and “soul-threatening” stress to first responders, we must determine the role of emergency responders in today’s environment. We must make a psychological transition. Prevention activities cannot take a back seat to manual fire suppression. We can revolutionize the fire service by changing from our philosophy that sees firefighters solely as “combat ready trench soldiers” to one that views them as “community oriented problem solvers.”
Many say that the past decade was an era of internal improvements in risk management. Certainly, operational changes in favor of firefighter health and safety have occurred with the creation of the two-in/two-out rule. Thermal imaging cameras have improved our operations during search procedures. Lightweight equipment has made many tasks more manageable. Yet, the fire service still has much to do in the upcoming years to promote the safety of all our customers.
Having first responders promote automatic suppression systems at the local level is a minimum. Endorsing passive fire protection features such as early warning detectors, fire rated interior finishes, and the testing of consumer products for flammability will take coalition building. Keeping public education and injury prevention messages reflective of local mortality and morbidity data will take networking.
For emergency responders, the next few years will bring unparalleled challenges in serving their local district. Having a clear vision of intervention measures will create the right atmosphere to change your role from “reactive” responder to “informed” public safety specialist.
Do not forget the lessons of fire deaths. Incidents such as the Indiana House fire should be a conscious reminder to you: Do not hesitate in your political action and community partnership. Planning, preparedness, response, and recovery require bold actions. Now is the time to take aim at the fire death rates among senior citizens, children, and emergency responders. By having the vision to make meaningful construction code changes, you can save lives long after you have passed the torch to the next generation of first responders.
WILLIAM SHOULDIS is a deputy chief with the Philadelphia (PA) Fire Department, where he has served for more than 29 years. He is an adjunct instructor for the National Fire Academy’s resident and field programs, teaching courses in fireground operations, health and safety, and prevention. Shouldis has a bachelor’s degree in fire science administration and a master’s degree in public safety. He is a member of the Fire Engineering editorial advisory board and a frequent FDIC speaker.
null
