Training for Tragedy

By DAVID N. DIEHL

In 2007 the Fire Service experienced 118 line-of-duty deaths. That is the third highest total in the past 10 years. Included also in the 2007 firefighter fatality totals were the deaths of nine firefighters in Charleston, South Carolina. After reading the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) report and the report released from the independent panel hired by the City of Charleston, it is clear to me that the circumstances that led to the deaths of “The Charleston Nine” could have happened to any of us. I do believe, however, that the Charleston incident sheds some light on an alarming, growing trend in the fire service as well as shows root causes often overlooked because, like a virus, they remain hidden until their effects cause serious injury or death. The root cause, I believe, is lack of adequate training on updated material. The fire service is terrific in generating statistical data on firefighter fatalities and injuries, but as a professional organization we are terrible in digesting those numbers and transforming them into a standard training format and disseminating it throughout the fire service.

I have followed firefighter fatality statistics for quite some time. Statistically speaking, per a United States Fire Administration (USFA) study conducted from 1990 to 2000, Lost, Caught, or Trapped Firefighters is now the second leading immediate cause of all fireground firefighter fatalities, at 18.2 percent. The reasons for this include, but are not limited to, lighter and tougher turnout gear that allows firefighters to travel faster and deeper into burning buildings and lightweight building construction, because of the effects fire has on this type of construction and its susceptibility to structural collapse.

Others will argue that these deaths were the result of poor communication or accountability. The problem gets even more clouded by the fact that the above listed arguments all have merit and, depending on the incident, may very well have played a part in the fatalities.

The fire service responded with increased training in incident command, SCBA training, and the development of rapid intervention teams (RITs). Legislation provided the two-in/two-out rule to protect firefighters on the fireground. Yet, in spite of the reduced numbers of structure fires annually, firefighters are dying at a rate of about 106 per year, or a line-of-duty death every 3½ days. In fact, we lose as many firefighters now as we did in the 1970s. Why?

By its very nature, the fire service is reactive, not proactive. We may develop lighter and tougher turnout gear to go deeper faster into a burning structure, but when we go too deep too fast, we organize RITs to get us out. We develop two-in/two-out protocols for our protection and then we use the extra personnel for fire attack or overhaul, because we are understaffed.

Case in point: There are three studies available through the National Fire Protection Association, the USFA, and NIOSH that not only describe who, what, where, and how fatalities and injuries happen, but one of the studies also outlines the trigger mechanisms or similarities preceding firefighter fatalities. Of the three studies, the USFA Firefighter Fatality Retrospective Study covered the longest period of time (1977 to 2000).

The report was released in April 2002 and did an excellent job of breaking down fatalities by type of duty, type of activity, time of day, rank, and geographic area. Four points stood out in this report:

1 The Executive Summary stated the following: Although the number of firefighter fatalities has steadily decreased over the past 20 years, the incidence of firefighter fatalities per 100,000 incidents has actually risen over the past five years, with 1999 having the highest rate of firefighter fatalities per 100,000 incidents since 1978.

2 Fifty-seven percent of firefighter fatalities were members of a volunteer fire department; 33 percent were career members.

3 Approximately 60 percent of all firefighter fatalities were over the age of 40.

4 Firefighters under the age of 35 were more likely to die of traumatic injuries than from medical causes. For firefighters over the age of 35, the proportion of traumatic injury deaths decreases, and the proportion of medically caused deaths rises steadily with age.

The USFA released another report in April 2002, “USFA Firefighter Fatality Summaries,” focusing on an 11-year period of fatalities of firefighters and other officials engaged in fire suppression, and offered the following:

• From 1990 to 2000, more than one million firefighters have been injured and 1,068 firefighters have lost their lives in the line of duty.
• At 18.2 percent, Lost, Caught, or Trapped Firefighters was the second (only to overexertion) leading Immediate Cause of Fatal Injury.

In July 2003, the U.S. Firefighter Disorientation Study was released; it focused on firefighter fatality circumstances from 1979 to 2001. It offered two structure definitions based on the number of windows and doors essential for rapid ventilation and emergency evacuation, as well as prolonged zero-visibility definitions. The definitions follow:

• Open Structure: windows and doors of sufficient number and size to provide for prompt ventilation and emergency evacuation; an open structure may or may not have a basement.
• Enclosed Structure: there is an absence of windows or doors of sufficient number and size to effect prompt ventilation and emergency evacuation; an enclosed structure may or may not have a basement.
• Prolonged Zero-Visibility Conditions: heavy smoke conditions lasting longer than 15 minutes.

Additionally, this study revealed nine staggering similarities among the firefighter fatality incidents studied:

• 100 percent occurred in enclosed structures.
• 94 percent showed no light, moderate, or heavy smoke on arrival.
• 100 percent of attack crews used an aggressive interior attack.
• 100 percent developed prolonged zero-visibility conditions.
• 100 percent experienced handline separation or tangled handlines during evacuation.
• 100 percent of attack crews experienced a loss of company integrity.
• 100 percent experienced disorientation.
• 88 percent of structures involved lacked a functioning sprinkler system.

The study determined that a sequence of events caused firefighter disorientation. As a rule, the disorientation sequence was as follows:

At an enclosed structure fire with smoke showing, the first-arriving fire company immediately initiated an aggressive interior attack to search for the seat of the fire. During the search, the seat of the fire could not be located, and conditions deteriorated; there were heat, smoke, and prolonged zero visibility. As companies performed an emergency evacuation because of deteriorating conditions, handline separation occured or tangled handlines were encountered. Disorientation then occured, as firefighters exceeded their air supply. They were caught in flashovers and backdrafts and were caught, lost, or trapped by collapsing roofs or floors.

When firefighters are not located quickly enough, the outcome is fatalities or serious injury. The disorientation sequence usually plays out in a structure that does not have a functioning sprinkler system.

The final determination of the study showed the root cause of disorientation that resulted in fatalities was the lack of knowledge about the extreme danger posed by fires in enclosed structures and the lack of recognition of the disorientation sequence.

The study also observed 17 incidents.

• 1 place of assembly;
• 1 office building;
• 1 multifamily dwelling;
• 2 single-family dwellings;
• 3 warehouses;
• 3 high-rise apartments; and
• 6 commercial structures.

Additionally, the structures’ construction was as follows:

• 5 fire resistant;
• 2 heavy timber;
• 7 unprotected noncombustible; and
• 3 protected wood-frame structures.

The report clearly indicates that the building use or construction type has no direct influence on whether or not a structure is enclosed.

We should also consider the Federal Aviation Administration’s spatial orientation definition: “our natural ability to maintain our body orientation and posture in relation to the surrounding environment (physical space), at rest and during motion.”

Since visual references provide the most important sensory information to maintain spatial orientation, a sudden loss of visual references, especially when the body or environment is in motion, may result in immediate disorientation. Remember that rapidly deteriorating conditions within a structure heavily involved in fire and smoke may create a sudden loss of visual references, resulting in rapid disorientation.

In 1998 NIOSH developed the Firefighter Fatality Database. After investigating firefighter injuries and fatalities, its research revealed that many firefighter injuries and fatalities were the result of the following:

• Poor physical fitness.
• Poor fire/rescue training.
• Inadequate staffing.
• Poor communication and communication equipment.
• Lack of written fireground procedures.
• No fireground accountability system.

For the record, I don’t base my opinions solely on statistical data. In some cases, depending on how the numbers are delivered, the math can misrepresent the reality. For example, if I said that 10 percent of all firefighters surveyed preferred using pickhead axes over any other tool, and you found out later that I asked only 100 firefighters, 10 firefighters is not very representative of the more than one million firefighters in service today. However, when a 23-year case study tells me that 60 percent of all firefighter fatalities are at or over the age of 40, I tend to listen. When the NFPA, the USFA, and NIOSH endorse a report that shows nine similarities directly attributed to firefighter fatalities and seven of them are present 100 percent of the time, I listen. When the administrator of the Firefighter Fatality Database says that poor fire/rescue training is a repeated reason for firefighter fatalities and injuries, I think that statement is 100 percent on target.

Some things to think about:

• The tragedy at Charleston happened in a commercial structure with large open areas. Although this structure had a large glass front and was ventible, firefighters operating in large open areas away from these openings may have prevented rapid evacuation. This could easily qualify as an enclosed structure because rapid evacuation was not attainable in some areas of the structure.
• The Charleston fire started as a trash fire with heavy smoke showing. Ninety-four percent of the incidents studied reported nothing, light, moderate, or heavy smoke showing on arrival.
• Just prior to the collapse, 16 Charleston firefighters were inside a well-involved structure fire. 100 percent of attack crews used an aggressive interior attack.
• The investigation showed the fatalities in multiple locations in the sofa warehouse. The investigation also revealed that disorientation, lack of accountability, handline separation or tangled handlines during rapid evacuation, and loss of company integrity played significant roles in the fatalities.
• Out of the nine firefighter fatalities, five were age 40 or over.

Of the 118 total 2007 firefighter fatalities, 71 (60.2 percent) were over the age of 40. I don’t think the numbers quoted in the studies misrepresent anything.

Any fire department dependent on years of experience exclusively for the protection of its personnel and that remains adamant in refusing to change in the face of new training information, new building construction techniques, new equipment, and new technology represents an unnecessary danger to its personnel by subjecting them to hazards, disregarding the professional reality of fighting fires.

DAVID N. DIEHL is captain of Engine 2 in the East Chicago (IN) Fire Department, where he has served since 1995. He is a certified instructorII/III through the Indiana Department of Homeland Security and the environmental health and safety manager for Tasks Force Tips in Valparaiso, Indiana. He began his fire service career with the Oxnard (CA) Fire Department in 1985 and has served as a volunteer firefighter in Northwest Indiana for seven years.