BLOWING THE BASICS, PART 3
BY TOM BRENNAN
We continue outlining the mistakes in the basics made early in an incident that critically affect the rest of the operation.
Failure to communicate “on the run.” This is a trait of the poor company officer (the same one who believes that his light beam cuts holes in ceiling). Information is usually a constant on the apparatus cab radio during the response. Apparatus configuration should allow a good company officer to relay information to his or her crew as received and any changes in tactics that may occur or are obvious from the information. This is the last huddle before the play. Fire described by radio traffic as on the top floor should change some tactics, as would the announcement that establishing a constant water supply is a problem. In any event, all members in the apparatus should know any information that is reported on the radio and the effect (if any) it may have on the arrival of the “team.”
Hose one size too small. This situation is usually found with the company that “always” stretches the preconnect. The trick in aggressive engine tactics and, therefore, extinguishment is don`t let the fire back you up (or out). This will almost always occur when hose that is too small for the operation is automatically or aggressively stretched. You cannot take a small-diameter hose into a fully involved supermarket (hopefully, we all agree on that). Why take it to a high-rise office building that is 40,000 square feet per floor and two fully involved supermarkets hanging hundreds of feet in the sky? Take the hoseline that will make you win. Remember, as the nozzle team that is first to arrive, you get only one chance to be the champ. You get a ton of chances to be the chump.
Failure to complete vertical ventilation. “How can you keep repeating this?” you ask. Simple, because it doesn`t get done! We discussed this for the past couple of months. Vertical ventilation is simple–you make an opening from the top of the building to the fire area below. That means secondary membranes to the skylights, scuttles, and stair doors. It means ceilings below those roofs that have been cut must be pushed down and out of the way. Otherwise, it means that you accomplished nothing.
I remember another “great” department that shared a firefighter death critique with the nation. A flashover occurred in a large dance hall, trapping the firefighter. In the critique, firefighters were shown cutting enormous holes in the roof of the public assembly building. The commentator (hopefully not a fire service member) quotes, “… and not being able to push down the ceiling, they went to another location and cut another hole.” At the formal critique shown in the videotape, the narrator said, “This flashover occurred despite sufficient vertical ventilation holes in the roof.” The roof had the holes all right, but not the room on fire that would trap the firefighter! Finish the hole! Vent the fire and not the cockloft or attic space!
Failure to establish initial and interim strategy and the tactics that must directly support it! Oh, man, is this a can of worms! What we are talking about here is the results of or results in–freelancing. Helter-skelter operations with no focus and therefore no support are guaranteed to result in inefficiency (at best) and costly injuries (at worst). Initial strategy may be as quietly established as the stretching of the interior line or as loud and complex as some incident command systems force them to be. Remember, don`t expend all your personnel establishing command and accountability systems because you`ll have no one to command, and accountability will take another route! Coupled with this confusion and delay is the strategy that fails to get supported. Interior attack strategy will collapse (literally and figuratively) without the tactics that allow an effective search and interior firefight to continue. That means ventilation, handline support, communication, continuous search operations, ventilation, and more ventilation.
Failure to gain continuous and adequate water supply. Running out of water is the same as encountering a burst hose immediately after starting water! The change in strategy inside the structure and the scuffle outside the structure create a delay that is insurmountable! If delay in water supply is an internal problem, it is a disgrace. If it is because of poor staffing or response policy, it should be broadcast in all its ramifications.
Failure to gain position of the aerial device. Just as an aerial that is out of place is useless and the cause of delays, so too are all the portable ladders and the equipment necessary for the many functions on the fireground useless if they are out of place. The distance to logistics (tools and equipment) makes it all but impossible to produce the procedures (and therefore the tactics) to support many of the rapid decisions and multitactic functions and changes necessary for safe and efficient (accountable) operations on any fireground. The second portable ladder is usually out of the question. The larger forcible entry tools are to remain in the compartment for use as needed (e.g., saw blade replacement). The salvage equipment is certainly delayed and sometimes not even used because the thought of the carry distance causes members to experience momentary “brain gas.” Lighting will be in the form of one lamp and certainly not the complex supply carried on the truck, which is too far from the fireground for the now tired, overworked, and understaffed firefighters–and certainly for the limited distance that an electrical junction box may be stretched from the truck`s electrical supply.
I can see some “jutted jaw” officers spewing, “Not on my shift!” Ha! If you don`t have these problems, you aren`t going to fires!
Delays come in all shapes and sizes. Terrain, traffic, weather, outside stimuli (accident, riot, etc.) are mostly uncontrollable. But if delay has been the result of the things listed here during the past few months, shame on you!
TOM BRENNAN has more than 33 years of fire service experience. His career spans more than 20 years with the City of New York (NY) Fire Department as well as four years as chief of the Waterbury (CT) Fire Department. He was the editor of Fire Engineering for eight years and currently is a technical editor. He is co-editor of The Fire Chief`s Handbook, Fifth Edition (Fire Engineering Books, 1995).
