CHANGE IT!
BY TOM BRENNAN
I am talking here to “early on” incident commanders–those people who are actually the heroes or the dupes of the success or failure of any structural fire response and operation. They are the ones making the instant, split-second, rapid-fire decisions that can mean life or death of the structure and life, injury, or more to the entire human load of the operation. This includes firefighters as well as civilian charges.
Years ago we “random-based” the concepts of strategy, tactics, and procedures in this column. Strategy, we said, is the game plan chosen, the musical selection for the orchestra to play. Tactics are those functions necessarily fulfilled to support the strategy chosen–ventilation, handline number and position, entry, and so on. Procedures are the materials to play the tactic to support the strategy success.
The major lesson in these terms is that, on the fireground, if the tactics cannot be put in place or are not directly supportive of the strategy chosen, you are guaranteed to have injuries on the fireground and lose more of the structure than you planned at size-up. In other words, if you cannot put the tactics in place (sufficient water supply, forcible entry, ventilation, search) to support the decision to begin an offensive interior attack, you must change to momentarily defensive or totally defensive at some point soon.
I guess the stimulating question for the month could be this: As the initial incident commander–lieutenant, captain, battalion chief–what events or situations can you list that would cause you to either prepare for a switch from offensive to defensive strategy or prevent you from using offensive strategy at all?
Loss of or inability to get water supply. This should speak for itself. If water is inadequate or fire is overwhelming the initial attack, you must begin to become defensive, protect your people, and change strategy–at least until tactical conditions improve. With the probability of water supply problems, your vertical ventilation team could be in trouble (depending on what level the fire is on, how the team got to the roof, and whether there are alternate safe areas such as adjoining buildings).
Certainly, your rear or outside entry and search team is assured trouble and must be prepared for possible withdrawal. Additional help should be called for water supply configurations and to protect exposures, which become priority when interior attack is abandoned and replaced with exterior attack.
Injuries. An injured firefighter who must be removed from a structure or a “found” civilian who must be carried out can play havoc with the tactical support. If you are like most departments in the United States, you don`t have enough people to do anything! An injured firefighter will completely break down the interior attack, as it will take two other firefighters to remove him. If five firefighters entered, that will leave two to stretch and use the handline, search, provide horizontal ventilation, perform reconnaissance, and all the other good things that must be done.
In departments such as mine, where staffing levels are just adequate, the same injured firefighter will break down the truck function by removing all the people or the handline as the officer, nozzleman, and backup person leave the building. If this handline is the only one on the fire, the entire operation will suffer. Prepare for it, and you can handle it. Do not prepare, and you will have an outside firefight on your hands with additional injuries.
Unanticipated fire extension. This is especially true if the fire breaks out under the level from which the original attack was mounted–you will have no choice but to back out interior forces. Not only is the hand-line not protected, but all that is protected is also in jeopardy. Extension in other areas on the same level or above will have to be judged on the amount and type of extension. Handlines may have to be backed to a new position and started again, and the interior forces may have to be put on hold in areas of refuge momentarily or completely withdrawn and started over. Again, planning for all options will be the key to success–even if it is limited now.
The reverse (from defensive to offensive strategy). The minute (instant) that a vacant building becomes occupied (either in fact or in thought), the defensive strategy must cease or be radically adjusted and interior support mounted. You may have well intentioned that a vacant structure will be an outside attack; however, if you determine that there may be the need for a primary search, or if there is evidence that someone (or more) must be removed, you must be prepared to support the interior operation and not allow defensive strategy “by routine” to cause injury. A similar condition exists when one firefighter crosses the threshold of the vacant structure–it is then an occupied building, and strategy must shift.
Hazardous materials. Corrosives, oxidizers, and toxic (Poison A and B) and explosive materials found in a structure during a firefight indicate a time for great and rapid concern and size-up with preparation for instantaneous strategy shift.
3If initial size-up or preplan indicates an Explosive A or B material or another another explosive threat, the strategy is obvious from the onset. However, if the potential for an explosion exists in the building, you must be prepared to shift strategies immediately (or as immediately as your indications give you)–such as if propane cylinders are stored above the fire or, worse, in the fire. The report that interior cellar gas meters are broken, melted, or leaking means that strategy must change. If meters are leaking and burning, you have time while your team controls the burn and shuts the gas before extinguishment. However, if the gas flame is extinguished before the supply is controlled or the gas has not yet ignited within the burning occupancy, it`s a Mayday: Evacuate and shift strategy.
Collapse (full or partial). Strategy shift. It may be local if the collapse is local. The usual answer is to evacuate, account for members, shift strategy, and begin again.
Now, you have seven reasons that the incident commander may have to call the change in strategy to protect firefighters and enhance the department`s property conservation goals. n
TOM BRENNAN is chief of the Waterbury (CT) Fire Department and a technical editor of Fire Engineering. He spent more than 20 years in some of the world`s busiest ladder companies in the City of New York (NY) Fire Department. He is co-editor of The Fire Chief`s Handbook, Fifth Edition (Fire Engineering Books, 1995).
