BY DAVID G. KILBURY
In the days following the aftermath of Hurri- cane Charley, the City of Cape Coral, Florida, responded to several hundred calls for service. Fire apparatus were being dispatched to alarms as soon as they became available after completing an alarm assignment. The county immediately to the south of Lee County (Collier) sent a five-engine task force to Cape Coral for the five days immediately following the storm. Many other areas throughout the county (Lee) were receiving mutual-aid assistance from other fire departments throughout the state as well. From an operational standpoint, Hurricane Charley presented the first opportunity for the State of Florida to implement many of the battle plans developed after Hurricane Andrew dealt the state a crushing blow in 1992.
Cape Coral, the third largest city in area (not population) in Florida, is 116 square miles in area, behind Jacksonville and Tampa. The projected population is approximately 135,000. Currently, the city has a fully paid career staff of 150 operating out of seven fire stations. An additional fire station is in the planning stages and nearing the construction phase. The Cape Coral Fire Department (CCFD) has three rescue, five engine, and two truck companies.
Cape Coral has its own Emergency Operations Center (EOC), a hardened facility designed and constructed so that it will not only survive a hurricane but also continue to function during the storm. Every county in the state of Florida is required to have an EOC; however, such a center is rare at the local municipal level.
 (1) Aggressive interior fire operations are underway in this rapidly advancing attic fire sparked from an electrical ignition source. (Photos by author.) |
null
 (2) This residential electrical panel box suffered a catastrophic electrical short. |
null
THE CHALLENGES
One of the biggest operational challenges following Hurricane Charley was to balance the available fire department resources with the emergency needs of the community. There were outbreaks of fires throughout the city as major power-restoration efforts got underway. Restoring power in the damaged areas frequently caused electrical fires. These fires ranged from trees sparking as they contacted the newly energized power lines to structure fires related to wiring that was severely damaged by the storm. Downed wires and debris strewn just about everywhere made it difficult to identify ignition hazards before the electricity was restored. As power was restored to specific areas, many of the built-in safety overload components of the electrical distribution system were malfunctioning or overloading, causing showers of sparks at the weakest points, often igniting items below.
Many of these fires involved electrical sparks showering down from limbs and other debris that were in contact with the electrical wires as power was being restored. At times, the sparks ignited materials, causing small fires that required suppression crews. At other fire calls, however, we simply made a quick check for hazards and moved on to the next call. Before departing, the company officer attempted to explain to the resident that the power crews would not respond to remove limbs, branches, or other debris from the power line while crews were engaged in restoring power. The residents, who had been without electrical power anywhere from two to four days, were facing the potential for another loss of power if debris came in contact with the power line.
In areas where major damage occurred, the power company would not restore power to buildings deemed unsafe because of structural damage and the potential for compromised wiring. The hurricane-force winds moved, buckled, or ripped away roofs and walls in commercial and residential occupancies; large objects, such as trees, damaged the structures and the internal wiring. When power was restored, some structures ignited. The utility’s position not to restore power in severely damaged buildings helped to prevent many fires.
Public relations and good customer service were vital to keeping the residents calm in these stressful situations.
RESOURCES
Early in the recovery phase when these fires were occurring, the resources of the CCFD quickly became depleted. Even with the additional five engines of the mutual-aid company, resources were strained at times. We determined that our “normal response” levels had to be changed dramatically if we were to meet the community’s needs in this post-storm environment.
In addition, Cape Coral was only months into a newly installed and operating dispatching software program for the fire and police departments; changing response levels was not easy during the hours after the hurricane. Prior to the launching of this new fire/police dispatching software program, the types of response for specific incidents through the first-, second-, and third-alarm levels were built into the program’s software. The extreme service demands placed on our fire/police agencies by Hurricane Charley were not anticipated when designing and developing the dispatching software program.
To reduce these fire department responses to alarms, we placed a battalion-level fire officer next to the dispatcher to assist in determining the response level necessary for a reported incident before the tones were sent out to the specific station(s). This manual override of the dispatching software enabled us to meet more of the overwhelming requests for services. As an example, a fire alarm in a commercial occupancy typically would generate an alarm assignment of one rescue, one truck, and two engine companies and a battalion commander (battalion chief). During the days following Hurricane Charley, this typical response was reduced to one engine or truck company unless a water flow alarm was indicated.
null
As power was restored, many fire alarm systems generated a signal activation to the monitoring company, which the company transferred to our dispatching center. Because of the number of fires occurring and the problems associated with the electrical distribution system throughout the city as power-restoration efforts continued, we could not ignore these fire alarms calls and consider them false alarms without responding and a quick on-site investigation. By assigning a battalion-level fire officer to assist the dispatcher, our limited fire department resources were allocated much more efficiently during the immediate post-storm phase. Even with the predetermined reduced response at the dispatch level, however, resources still were extremely strained at times.
Well before the eye of Hurricane Charley came ashore with Category 4-strength winds just north of Cape Coral in Charlotte County, all fire/police department operations were suspended because of safety concerns related to wind speeds in excess of 40 mph. This 40-mph wind speed was the predetermined threshold at which our personnel and apparatus would take shelter and wait for the hurricane to move northward. Operations were suspended for about four to five hours. However, even though fire and police department field operations were suspended, there was no slowdown in the volume of 9-1-1 calls coming into our dispatch center, many of them from desperate citizens reporting tornados touching down in their areas and seeking last-minute evacuation. Citizens who had decided to ride out the storm quickly changed their minds when 90-plus-mph winds (some wind gusts reached 120 mph) catastrophically removed the sheltering components of their homes at unimaginable velocity. The fire department 9-1-1 dispatching center had more than 150 calls waiting to be dispatched even before the fire department resumed responding to incidents. As each call arrived into the 9-1-1 center, dispatchers and the fire department officer assigned to assist the dispatch center would attempt to reprioritize the list of “pending calls.”
TRAVEL DIFFICULTIES
The city’s geographical layout presented yet another challenge: Mutual-aid companies needed CCFD assistance in finding the addresses of the locations for which alarms were received. Cape Coral has a canal system that extends 300 to 400 miles throughout the city and interrupts many roadways. There are no bridges except for the major routes. To assist our mutual-aid fire companies, our department assigned a firefighter to read the map and be the navigator for every responding mutual-aid fire apparatus. The assigned CCFD firefighter also was vital to preventing a major communications problem and in enhancing personnel accountability; radio communications were taking place on several frequencies. Assigning this CCFD firefighter to ride with mutual-aid companies also made it easier to locate rehab areas, fuel sites, fire stations, hydrants, and food and water sites; to navigate; and to direct citizens to shelter locations.
FIRE OPERATIONS/COMMAND
I served as incident commander (IC) of a fire in the attic of a single-story residential home. On arrival, light smoke was showing from the eaves of the structure. My challenges were radio communications with mutual-aid companies assigned to the alarm and attempting to track these companies throughout the incident. I knew from reading and studying previous firefighter injury and fatality reports that a breakdown in and lack of accountability were contributing factors in these cases. It was an achievement just to get the mutual-aid fire companies “call-sign” designation correct over the radio. When you work for a particular jurisdiction and are used to the “home team,” it is not easy to have to call apparatus by different names and numbers when flames are showing and fireground tasks need to be assigned. On this alarm, I had more mutual-aid than CCFD companies on-site. I focused on being the IC and knew what had to be accomplished, but I did not know the capabilities and experience of many of the crews. Each mutual-aid company repeated its assignment over the radio at the time of assignment; communications worked well. The mutual-aid companies performed their duties exceptionally well; the fire was rapidly extinguished, given the circumstances of the rapidly moving attic fire.
null
This was the first time I served as IC at a fire where I had no idea of the on-scene firefighters’ capabilities and experience. Do you think I had any reservations or concerns regarding the safety of the personnel at this fire? You bet I did! It was obvious that all companies on-scene that day trained together and knew their jobs well. The strategy identified and the tactics deployed by the fire companies brought this fire to a quick end. Once the crews had their respective apparatus back in service, we conducted a short post-analysis of the fire on the front lawn, knowing that we would probably not have an opportunity to hold one in the future. I shared with all on-scene crews what I had learned as the IC and my satisfaction with the performance of their duties. Each company officer had the opportunity to share their assignments, difficulties, and successes at the incident. I was truly impressed by the abilities of all companies operating on the scene that day.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
Following are some of the lessons learned from this hurricane response:
- When a large-scale event such as a hurricane, major fire/explosion, or terrorist attack occurs, look to current publications in the form of a quick-reference guide designed for emergency responders for a course of action if your community has not developed these contingency plans already. Be prepared to be flexible within these plans and take appropriate actions as the operational demands dictate. Keep asking yourself, “What can I do to make this event more manageable, efficient, and simplistic?”
- Implement and use a structured incident command system to manage all aspects of the incident safely and efficiently. Be prepared to work with other agencies, even outside the usual governmental agencies, to assist in you in planning and operating during major events such as a hurricane. In this particular event, agencies such as the local power company, telecommunications, the Red Cross, private relief organizations, the local building association, Community Emergency Response Teams, and HAM radio operators were just a few that allowed our fire department and the entire city to provide better service to the public. In cooperation with the local utility company, we knew when certain areas of the city were going to have power turned back on, allowing us to move fire apparatus into those areas to prepare for the outbreak of electrical-related fires.
Keep in mind that events such as these are simply too big for any agency to handle by itself. Our city welcomed the assistance and had built it into our “battle plan” before this event occurred. Will your agency be prepared to use outside resources and operate efficiently when they arrive to help?
- How will your department communicate with mutual-aid fire companies?
- Our personnel, apparatus, and equipment survived this terrible event because it had been predetermined that all public safety agencies would take shelter when wind speeds reached 40 mph.
- We know not to use all of our staff resources early in a storm such as this; everyone would become fatigued simultaneously.
- Make sure to send command staff to a rehab of some type with time off/away from the command center. Fresh staff will be required for days following a major hurricane.
- Before a hurricane strikes, assign a person to determine where the families of your fire department members will take shelter. If, after the storm, you can tell your personnel working tirelessly in the field that their families have been contacted and are safe, your personnel can stay focused on their operational mission without distractions or apprehensions. This simple task will be a huge mental relief to your firefighting personnel.
Reflecting on the events surrounding Hurricane Charley, I am still amazed at the events that unfolded in our community. In one week, I experienced many challenges and lessons that I have not encountered in my 20 years of fire service experience. Hurricane Charley challenged our entire city, and we all did an exceptional job.
My advice is to train with every opportunity that presents itself to you and your fire company. Read and learn from the successes and failures of other firefighters so that you may make yourself a better firefighter and will not repeat others’ mistakes.
Be prepared for the unexpected. You never know what you will be required to do at your next alarm. You must trust and be confident in your abilities and those of the personnel working beside you on the fireground. When faced with the unique challenges of this job, such as a hurricane or a structure fire, never lose sight of your basic training and sound firefighting techniques. These skills must stay with you always.
DAVID G. KILBURY is a battalion commander with the City of Cape Coral (FL) Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Management Service, where he has served 17 of his 20 years in the fire service. He has a master’s degree in human resources, a bachelor’s degree in professional studies (public administration), and an associate’s degree in fire science technology. He works part-time as a basic fire instructor at the Southwest Florida Public Service Academy (Fire School) in Fort Myers, Florida. He is State of Florida certified as instructor-III, fire officer I, EMT, and paramedic.
