BY BRIAN A. CRAWFORD
For every decision-making process involving individuals, groups, or even whole organizations, competing cognitive forces of the mind will be at odds as to whether that decision should ever be made. This is an internal psychological process for individuals; depending on the issue’s seriousness, the subconscious can decide the matter in a split second or only after a lengthy wrestling match in the conscious mind. For groups and organizations, the process is less about individual thought and more about the collective culture as a whole.
This is important for firefighters; both the individual and organizational processes affecting decision making can play a significant role in whether a firefighter dies in the line of duty or walks away. This critical decision-making moment is called the “firefighter tipping point.”
To understand the psychology behind firefighter tipping points, we first need to define the term and its relationship to the fire service. Second, we need to examine the decision-making process that drives the evolution and eventual culmination of such situations.
A tipping point of an event or process is that moment at which the identifiable or unidentifiable actions or inactions, choices, or judgments made are recognized as having the greatest impact on a final outcome. Tipping points occur during the watershed decision processes of lifee.g., deciding whether or not to go to college, get married, have children, and so forth. Although these are often extended processes, somewhere along the way, there are normally a series of critical decisions that led to the eventual outcome. These decisions caused a cascading effect and drove the process, at some point, in a direction from which there was no return.
In firefighter tipping points, the field of opportunity and focus of time are significantly narrow compared to the examples above. They involve a single emergency incident lasting only a few hours that requires critical decision making to arrive at a specific outcomenegative, neutral, or positive. For emergency workers and military personnel, critical decision making occurs daily and more often than among civilians. The nature of these occupations exposes personnel to sometimes daily judgments that can potentially affect their lives and the lives of others.
A tipping point can occur at any time; its consequences may be immediately seen or may take some time to be recognized. The darkening down of a raging fire is a consequence of the decision to use more direct water application. On the other hand, a firefighter lost in the maze of a commercial structure may not know that he has already passed the tipping point that led to his situation until it is too late, leading to the often-asked question, “How did I get in this situation?” If he can backtrack, undoubtedly, he will recognize past decisions he made that led to his current situation; if these are not adjusted, the ultimate outcome will be tragic.
TIPPING POINTS AND LODDs
In events in which firefighters are killed in the line of duty, each event, if displayed as a series of written actions, will include decision-making moments. Some of these decisions are nonurgent and routine; others are critical; and some are ultimately fatal. Each judgment will produce a rational or irrational final choice and be based on explicit or tactical assumptions.
Whether a firefighter’s thought process is rational or irrational often depends on the time available to make a decision. In the fire service, when an incident is escalating, time often equals increased risk. Firefighters are under constant pressure to minimize the emergency as quickly as possible. Research has shown that time/pressure decision making reduces an individual’s ability to consider all options available, which is further compounded by the fact that as situational risk increases, so does one’s propensity to take risk.1
For example, when a firefighter dies in the line of duty because he became entrapped and entangled, it is possible to determine when and where the tipping point actions occurred that began to shape his ultimate demise. By working in reverse chronological order from the moment of the death and reviewing key actions, and thus decision moments and judgments, the tipping point can be exposed. In Figure 1, tipping point decisions are in red; their cascading effect is indicated by a progressively darkening gray scale. Firefighter A’s death is represented by a “0”; the actions prior are positive numbers, and those after are negative.
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In the Figure 1 scenario, one could argue that there are multiple candidates for tipping point actions, including decisions made by others that affected the firefighter’s course. However, if we focus solely on the firefighter and his judgments, several critical decisions made were more significant to the outcome than others. These choices, highlighted in red, set in motion a series of events from which the firefighter was ultimately unable to recover.
Starting at point 9, the firefighter decides to look for fire extension and advance the hoseline. This decision could arguably be the beginning of this tipping point. The firefighter probably considered staying where he was, backing out to a more secure position, or advancing the hoseline and looking for fire spread. His mind possibly raced through a series of thought processes. Despite the seemingly overwhelming information that would support the firefighter’s (1) staying where he was or (2) backing out for an exterior (defensive) attack, this firefighter decided to advance the line.
OVERCONFIDENCE
In critical situations, some firefighters fail to consider their own life safety and that of their crew. Some incident commanders (ICs) may not consider the safety of the companies they command. Because of an illusion of safety, often they fail to thoroughly evaluate the considerable risk at which they could be unnecessarily placing themselves and others.
This occurs when firefighters are lulled into believing they are safer than they are because of overconfidence.2 This is a negative effect of conditions designed to increase firefighter safety (e.g., comprehensive safety standards, personal protective equipment/clothing, dynamic training, work experience, and a competent command structure). Although such measures may provide firefighters with a greater sense of safety, firefighters may become overconfident. Relying on these safeguards, firefighters may neglect normal safety considerations in their own decision making at the emergency incident scene.
A classic example involves the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s 1972 decision to place child safety caps on prescription medicines. Although the protective measure was intended to increase children’s safety, it actually resulted in a significant spike in fatal accidental overdosings among children. Because the medicine containers included a childproof safety cap, some overconfident parents apparently thought they didn’t need to be so vigilant in keeping them out of their child’s reach. For firefighters, such overconfidence can be equally as dangerous. Although additional safeguards may be in place, that does not mean you can abandon standard safety practices.
To ensure the effectiveness of layers of additional safety practices and resources employed in today’s fire service, individual judgments and actions also must play a major role on an incident scene.(2)
INFLUENCES
Firefighters make decisions based on a number of influences, such as their department’s organizational culture and performance expectancies. Combined with a firefighter’s own self-image and psyche, this creates a picture in the individual’s mind of what makes a “good” firefighter. In organizations with an overly aggressive firefighting style, firefighters may be likely to take more unnecessary risks. If this behavior is reinforced through praise or reward, and no negative consequences result, it is likely to be repeated. The laws of probability come into play, and recurrent, increasingly risky behavior eventually results in negative consequences.
SUBCONSCIOUS DECISIONS
Hardly a moment goes by when an individual is not making a decision. Most of the decisions are accomplished subconsciously; they are never given much thought beforehand or reflection afterward. Choices are made quickly, effortlessly, implicitly, and spontaneously through a series of mental processes derived largely from patterns, habits, and conditioning that allow the mind to essentially work on autopilot.3
How many times have you gotten ready for work in the morning and, after the task, wondered if you washed your hair while showering or later brushed your teeth? We performed the necessary action (e.g., waking, showering, dressing, and even getting in the car and driving) without any really in-depth thought. The brain relegates such routine thought to the subconscious to free up the conscious mind to focus on more significant matters that pose the greatest threat to firefighter safety.
CONSCIOUS DECISIONS
Decision making involving the conscious mind uses deliberate cognitive processes that evaluate and judge the potential effects of an action or inaction before an individual proceeds. These are generally slower, more deliberate, and controlled. (3) Understanding the conscious decision-making process is critical to firefighters because of the inherently dangerous nature of their work. Conscious assessments and the resulting decisions can mean the difference between life and death.
It is important to compare the subconscious and conscious decision-making processes because of the possible dangers in using one instead of the other. For example, in training, a firefighter develops task proficiency over time as the skill is repeated; it eventually becomes habitual. When this occurs, the brain moves such actions to the subconscious, including the original firefighting training and any aberrant modifications repeatedly performed on the fireground and reinforced by the organization.
For example, if a firefighter uses an overly aggressive and risky firefighting style at each opportunity, this style will eventually become subconsciously habitual and impulsive. Such classic conditioning may lead the firefighter to approach all fires (commercial and residential) as similar tasks requiring parallel and programmed actions. In reality, the only common component to any fire is the element of fire itself.
The complexities and multiple variables associated with a dynamic fire or an emergency event are arguably in the thousands. Although a firefighter may use his subconscious mind in performing basic skills, such as handline operations, he should use a conscious analytical process in considering critical choices involving life safety (e.g., whether or not to enter a structure). In making a critical decision subconsciously, the firefighter may fail to carefully consider the various potential outcomes of the multiple options. With subconscious, impulsive action, controlled conscious decision making is obstructed, and a negative consequence is likely.4
Reinforcing proper training, emphasizing good practical experience, and holding after-action critiques of individual and collective performance encourage conscious decision making and inhibit poor habitual and impulsive behavior.5
OUTCOME CERTAINTY
Another variable in early-stage decision making involves the certainty of consequences. Most prefer to make the decision with a guaranteed outcome vs. the one in which the consequences are uncertain and risky. However, there is a break-over point at which the riskier decision will be entertained, depending on whether its outcome, although not certain, is potentially better than that of the guaranteed outcome.6 This means that during a critical incident, firefighters using conscious decision making are more likely to take a risk if its reward is potentially greater than that of the guaranteed or safe choice.
For example, we assign a value of $1,000 to the firefighter decision with a guaranteed outcome. However, the risky choice offers a potential reward of $1,200 or nothing. Which is the greater value, and which choice will the firefighter be more inclined to select?
Research tells us that it depends on the probability of the risk value factor. If there is a 75 percent chance of achieving the $1,200 and a 25 percent chance of receiving nothing, the “expectation” of this gamble is .75 × $1,200 + .25 × 0 = $900. Since the $900 expectation is less than the guaranteed $1,000, the firefighter will likely choose the guaranteed outcome. However, using the same example, if the probability, reward, or both are increased, as in $1,400 with an 85 percent probability and 15 percent chance of receiving nothing, the expectation is now .85 × $1,400 + .15 × 0 = $1,190. This expectation exceeds the guaranteed $1,000; thus, the firefighter will be more inclined to take the risk. (6)
Although the examples above offer definitive and computable calculations, the mind can make an on-the-spot percentage evaluation based on a number of variables, such as past experience, education, and training, as well as intuition. As the firefighter is sending current situational awareness information to the brain, the brain is racing through all of the stored memory and in the end will merge the two past and present constructs to reach a conclusion.
Most decision-making research focuses on the analytical properties involved in the process. However, thousands of other mental images and internally derived questions by the conscious and subconscious can also lead to a “gut” feeling or intuition. Most people believe that making a decision based on solid education, training, experience, and the facts of the current situation is the best method. When someone says, “I just have a bad feeling about this,” that feeling is just a simply stated emotional response that comes to mind. In reality, there is a great deal of credibility in the scientific community for the position that intuition and other emotional responses play a key role in decision making.7
Gut feelings or intuition can be tied directly to subconscious and conscious thought. Although partially an emotional response, the emotion does not cause the intuitive feeling but rather is a reaction to it. It is that emotion that plays a part in decision making and should not be dismissed. Researchers believe that these feelings are the brain’s way of reviewing its vast caverns of stored information and deriving a general summation of the current situation. These memory reviews are not limited to a relationship with the current situation, as in only reviewing fire department items if at a fire, but rather they open up the entire catalog of memory for a supersonic review. It is this review that the brain collectively forms into an “opinion” on the current situation. It then releases the necessary chemical reaction to represent its findings and feelings to the body. The end result is the gut and intuitive feeling.
As often found on the emergency scene, when making a decision with limited or incomplete information, the mind tends to lean on more simple problem-solving aids, such as emotions, intuitions, and rules of thumb, than on complex processing. (7) These emotional choices can be rapid and highly automatic responses specific to events that can contrast with the controlled processing of deliberate rationale. Deliberate rationale allows time for thought about the consequences of our choices.8 However, for most firefighters, percentages of both intuitive and deliberate rationale apply. The best way to obtain an optimal outcome is to realize when each plays a role and to use the proper application specific to the situation. This means, when necessary and perceivable, taking the time to make the right cognitive decisions and realizing the other automatic mental processes are already engaged.
It is critical for firefighters and fire departments’ success and survival that each realize that all decisions made on the emergency scene affect the eventual outcome. It should be understood that there are groups of identifiable judgments that are more central in creating and instigating a break-over point that leads to certain conclusions. These are tipping points; by further understanding the decision-making process, you can minimize the negative effects. Giving further consideration to the key role and importance that critical judgments play in whether a firefighter dies or makes it home at the end of a shift, we begin to understand that the mind is a firefighter’s greatest resource in these dangerous and dynamic situations. We just must remember to use it.
Endnotes
1. Dror, I, J Busemeyer, B Basola. “Decision making under time pressure: An independent test of sequential sampling models.” Memory & Cognition; 1999, 27(4): 713-725.
2. Wilde, G. Target Risk. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: PDE Publications, 1994.
3. Kahneman, D. “A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality.” American Psychologist; September 2003, 58(9), 697-720.
4. Leland, D, M Paulus. “Increased risk-taking decision-making but not altered response to punishment in stimulant-using young adults.” Drug and Alcohol Dependence; 2005, 78(1), 83-90.
5. Chapman, G, L Niedermayerxc. “Action, inaction, and factors influencing perceived decision making.” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making; 2001, 14(4): 295308.
6. Kahneman, D, A Tversky. “Choices, values, and frames,” American Psychologist; 1984, (39): 341-350.
7. De Martino, B, R Dolan, D Kumaran, B Seymore, “Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision Making in the Human Brain,” Science; August 4, 2006, (313): 684-687.
8. Cohen, J, G Lowenstein, S McClure, A Sanfey, “Neuroeconomics: cross-currents in research on decision making,” Trends in Cognitive Science; 2006, 10(3): 112.
BRIAN A. CRAWFORD is the chief and a 24-year veteran of the Shreveport (LA) Fire Department. He is a National Fire Academy (NFA) resident instructor as well as an NFA Executive Fire Officer Program (EFO) graduate, an IAEM certified emergency manager and IAEM certification commissioner and holds the Chief Fire Officer (CFO) designation from the Commission on Professional Credentialing. Crawford is a member of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), serving on its Human Relations committee. He is a graduate of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Senior Executives in State and Local Government and has a master of arts degree in industrial psychology, a bachelor of science degree in organizational management, and an associate of science degree in paramedics from Bossier Parish Community College, where he is also an adjunct faculty member.
