Filing a Flight Plan

BY ALAN BRUNACINI

The initial period of any out-of-control situation that requires effective command creates a fairly standard challenge for the first boss to arrive at the scene of whatever is causing the problem. That person must decide how he is going to personally behave so he can begin to stabilize and then resolve the problem while ensuring responder safety. That boss can be greatly affected by the urgency of the event and the critical need for effective action at that very moment.

If that manager (incident commander, or IC)) does not have the ability to personally separate himself from the initial urgency of what is going on around him, he can be taken over (emotionally hi-jacked) by that urgency. When that boss gives into the “temptation of urgency,” he gets sucked into the action and becomes part of the problem. Then, it becomes impossible to establish and maintain command of the incident. Many times, the IC chooses action over command, placing him directly in the hazard zone and, in really exciting times, in a situation where he is trying to physically save himself from the problem instead of working (as a manager) to eliminate the problem.

Last month, we started a discussion on an unsafe firefighting practice we don’t discuss much in our business called “freelancing.” This unsafe practice occurs when the first-arriving company officer does not take command when he first gets on the scene. This action orientation, instead of initial command orientation, happens because the urgency the fire is creating in the initial stage outperforms the standard operating procedures (SOPs), training, and personal discipline of that officer.

It sounds pretty simple when some crazy old fire chief drones on and on about the evils of freelancing. Freelancing, sadly, fits into the center of the current campaign in our business that relates to how we reduce operational injuries and firefighter deaths. One of the parts of this effort that continually emerges is the (frustrated) comment that “somehow we must change our culture.”

My problem is that when I get up in the morning, I honestly, as a boss, do not know exactly how to start the struggle for a safer culture. Simply, it’s pretty hard for me to take a picture of our “culture,” but I do know how to take a snapshot of what a first-arriving company officer does when he first arrives on the fire scene. I can watch what the officer does and listen to what he says.

As the officer’s boss, I can commend him if he does what the SOPs say IC #1 is supposed to do when he arrives, and I also can engage him in a corrective session (!) if he submits to the 260-year-old freelancing cultural message that Ben Franklin is whispering in his ear. This is where I as a boss can do my part in the safety struggle. The boss game plan is really pretty simple. Develop smart, simple SOPs that are based on the actual work we perform. Train the troops in those procedures. Actively be present when the troops train and perform. Consistently critique tactical activity. Commend/coach/correct performance. Fix safety problems. I have a role I can play in redirecting our standard cultural response by adding fast attack command to the beginning of our attack on offensive fires. I am going to change the beginning part of the regular (culturally driven) routine by making my voice louder and my presence more visible than Ben’s.

The safety problems that freelancing creates are the result of spontaneous, uncommanded action that generally involves extending as rapidly as possible an attack directly on the fire. The fast attack rush is many times extended with only a singular, tunnelized focus on what is the shortest and most direct route to the fire. An effective initial size-up must take in and quickly consider the entire scene. Opening up the IC’s tactical perspective shows where the fire is going and reduces potentially painful surprises.

The initial officer must evaluate both what is burning and what is left to burn. The strategy and incident action plan (IAP) must be developed around the current and forecasted profile of fire location, size, complexity, direction/avenue of travel, number, location, condition of occupants, and location/nature of exposures. Sometimes the fastest route to the fire contains tactical “sucker punches” that a quick/complete size-up identifies and redirects the first attack line into a position that better cuts off the fire and protects the occupants, structure, and firefighters.

The singular fast attack focus also creates a one-position (all your eggs in one basket) operating approach. Many times, that critical position really requires support work like forcible entry, ventilation, and creating operational access points (truck work) and backup hoseline positioning that either reinforces line 1 or covers another critical operating position (second engine). Having company officer IC #1 make those assignments quickly at the beginning of operations creates a coordinated, more complete initial attack team response.

The local incident command system (commanded by Type 5 and 4 overhead teams) is designed to eliminate freelancing by requiring the first-arriving officer on the scene to establish initial command by performing the standard command functions. This is actually a very simple and effective procedure; when it is followed, we create an orderly and under-control operational beginning— good beginnings produce good endings.

When we produce a strong, standard, under-control front end with an in-place commander, all operational action is accounted for and managed from the very beginning by IC #1. When the critical need for action seduces us and we skip initial command and go directly into the freelancing, fast attack mode, the uncommanded action we take is not accounted for—simply, no one knows who is where or what they are doing. If something bad happens, no one has filed (or is operating within) a hazard zone “flight plan,” so they are pretty much on their own if they get into tactical trouble. At this no-command-in-place point (God forbid), to whom do you transmit a Mayday?

Another challenge and complication that uncommanded initial action causes is when the battalion/district chief arrives in the middle of the beginning and all the workers are working (somewhere?) in the hazard zone and no one has taken command. The command system requires command to be established at the beginning of the beginning. Now, the chief must recreate what occurred before his arrival. The chief must desperately determine the current status of the hazard zone workers—many times, everyone went to the most fun/action/danger (favorite) place. It’s tough when the beginning of any system does not actually occur until the middle (this is often referred to as a “cluster”).

The command system is built around the eight standard functions of command. These management activities create a very practical job description for the IC. Doing the functions will lead that person through a complete command routine. The system starts out with function number one: Assume, confirm, and position command. This beginning function is designed to initiate command when we first arrive on the scene. Establishing strong initial command displaces and eliminates freelancing because all initial and ongoing action occurs under command of the current IC, starting out with IC #1.

Most local incident command systems understand the critical need for fast, very active rescue and fire control at the very beginning of our arrival. Those systems generally create in their command systems the capability of initial-arriving company officers to combine command and action. This is referred to as a “fast attack mode” in local command SOP terms. That basic procedure describes a standard rapid action routine for a first-arriving company officer on the scene of a working situation.

The fast attack SOP would typically outline how that officer would do a rapid initial size-up; give a standard initial radio report; quickly assign the next wave of arrivers (like the next engine, truck, and rescue); and pack up and, with a portable radio, go with his crew into the hazard zone and rapidly attempt to find the fire, cut it off, and put it out. The procedure is designed to combine the benefit of a fast, well-placed attack within the command and control of a highly engaged company officer performing as IC #1.

Sometimes, the initial reaction in the conversation about going from freelancing to establishing IC #1 at the beginning of the firefight is that we are going to take 10 minutes while the fire is getting bigger and bigger to set up a complicated management system, because we all must adjust all the wrinkles out of our command vests before we do anything about putting any water on the fire. With a one-minute, simple initial management investment in the beginning, we can save an extremely frustrating (and unsafe) 45 minutes in the middle. Another benefit we quickly notice is that when we start out under control, we actually outperform freelancing (read quicker) because we are in the right place doing the right thing the first time. We don’t have to redo a lot of stuff because we did it on a full run with our eyes shut.

Retired Chief ALAN BRUNACINI is a fire service author and speaker. He and his sons own the fire service Web site bshifter.com.

 

More Fire Engineering Issue Articles

 

Fire Engineering Archives

 

Dave McGlynn and Brian Zaitz

The Training Officer: The ISFSI and Brian Zaitz

Dave McGlynn talks with Brian Zaitz about the ISFSI and the training officer as a calling.
Conyers Georgia chemical plant fire

Federal Investigators Previously Raised Alarm About BioLab Chemicals

A fire at a BioLabs facility in Conyers, Georgia, has sent a toxic cloud over Rockdale County and disrupted large swaths of metro Atlanta.