IED Awareness and Response

By CANDICE McDONALD

Responding to a call involving an improvised explosive device (IED) is something most firefighters are fortunate not to have to experience in their careers. However, all firefighters should become knowledgeable on IEDs to ensure their own safety and survival.

During my day job, I work in federal law enforcement and maintain constant awareness of potential threats. During my off hours, I serve with a rural fire department in a “leave your doors unlocked all the time” type of community. So, when I received the text from dispatch reporting an IED in a mailbox, I was doubtful.

Responding to an IED call at a location just down the street from my residence is not something I thought would ever occur in my small town. However, as seen from incidents reported by the media, IED users don’t discriminate geographically or demographically. Historically, terrorists have used explosives as a tactic; the Department of Homeland Security indicated that this is because IEDs have been proven effective, instructions on how to build them are easily accessible, the cost is low, and the psychological effects are high. IEDs pose a threat to life safety and the structural integrity of buildings. As firefighters, our personal safety is priority, and gaining a better understanding of IEDs will help to increase safety.

Identifying an IED

When I arrived on scene to the location of this possible IED, I was surprised to see a pipe bomb in the mailbox. First responders must identify IEDs to ensure they can take the precautions necessary to remain safe. An IED is a device manufactured or placed in an improvised way that incorporates destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and is designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It can also be commercial or homemade.

IEDs are diverse in appearance and consist of four parts, often referred to by the acronym PIES (power source, initiator, explosive, and switch). A container may also be included as a fifth piece of the device. IED containers provide concealment, the ability to transport, and increase lethality.

IEDs have three main power sources: an electric power source such as a battery; a nonelectric source, which can come from a mechanical action that operates under pressure and stores enough energy to make an initiator function; and a heat source such as a flame or fuse. Initiators also are diverse and can include items such as blasting caps, spark plugs, bulbs, and igniters that burn at high temperatures. IEDs also use several types of explosives, from low to high. The majority of IEDs discovered in the United States consist of low explosives in a pipe casing such as the one to which we were responding. The switch components of an IED may be simple or complex, and multiple switches may be used. Switches can include items such as timers, cell phones, and passive infrared devices. Our pipe bomb was about five inches long and made from galvanized metal, with both ends crimped and soldered shut.

Understanding the Effects of the Blast

The four types of injuries resulting from a blast are primary, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary. A primary blast injury occurs from the direct effects of the blast to the body. Secondary blast injury is the most common cause of death during an incident and is caused by flying debris and fragmentation from the IED. A tertiary blast injury occurs when a victim of the explosion is thrown against stationary objects. Quaternary blast injuries are all other injuries that do not fall into the other three categories and often include burns, crush injuries, breathing problems, and brain injuries.

Flying debris from secondary blasts often results in penetrating trauma, comparable to that which is sustained in a motor vehicle collision, a gunshot wound, or a stabbing. The trauma is often caused by metal fragments from the IED casing or added internal components such as nails, screws, ball bearings, rocks, or glass to increase destruction. The fragments project from the devices at a high rate of speed and can travel hundreds to thousands of meters. Radiographic images from the Boston Marathon bombing victims showed embedded shrapnel such as ball bearings; nails; screws; and the IED casing itself, which was a pressure cooker. In the case of the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing, 40 percent of the survivors’ injuries were classified as secondary blast injuries that came from glass.

Safety Considerations

When responding to an IED event, deploy the “5 Cs” as a set of guidelines: Confirm, Clear, Cordon, Check, and Control.

Confirm. Always treat a possible IED as if it could explode without notice. From a safe distance and while maintaining cover, identify and document any IED indicators by interviewing witnesses and obtaining a visual of possible components. Also, visually inspect only from a safe standoff point; a first responder should never approach or touch the device to “get a better look.”

Clear. Initiate evacuation procedures and determine incident perimeters. Ensure all bystanders and unnecessary personnel are evacuated from the incident scene. Only first responders conducting active operations should be inside the operational perimeter; stage all others in multiple safe locations for future deployment.

Cordon. Restrict access to the incident perimeter by posting personnel and vehicles at access points.

Check. After establishing and moving out of the hot zone, check the warm and cold zones for secondary devices before establishing operations.

Control. The incident commander (IC) should authorize, maintain accountability, and permit scene access only to personnel needed for operations.

We quickly deployed the 5 Cs for the above incident. We confirmed that the IED was treated as live with the possibility that it could explode at any time. We established a standoff point and maintained cover at a distance behind vehicles. We then contacted the area bomb squad for response (photo 1), established the incident perimeter, and cleared all bystanders from the area. We then cordoned all roads leading to the area by barricading them with a truck and staffing it with a firefighter to prohibit access. We then checked the area and cleared it of all other threats. Last, the IC maintained control by restricting access to all except the bomb squad, area law enforcement, and authorized personnel.

In the event of a preblast scenario, firefighters must establish safe perimeters and be aware of the recommended standoff distances for bomb threats. These recommended distances are based on the hazard of fragmentation distance or threshold for rupturing of the ear drum. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Bomb Data Center and Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Office of Bombing Prevention has a “Bomb Threat Standoff” card that first responders can use as a tool. The card offers quick visuals of the IED threat, the capacity of explosives, building evacuation distances, and outdoor evacuation distances. It is important to note that the standoff distances are based on the minimum evacuation distance to prevent a life-threatening injury, but other injuries such as hearing loss can occur. Incidents occurring in rural areas should add additional evacuation distances because of the reduction in places of cover that would reduce the impact of fragmentation. Departments can order the standoff card by contacting their local DHS Security Protective Security Advisor or by e-mailing the Office for Bombing Prevention at [email protected].

The recommended evacuation distance for a small IED such as a pipe bomb is 1,200 feet. For a large IED such as a suitcase bomb, it is 1,850 feet; and for a standard-size vehicle bomb, it is 1,900 feet. There are several considerations for coordinating evacuation. The alert should be transparent and not be done under false pretenses such as a fire drill. Establish multiple evacuation locations, each of which should be fully searched before being used. Building occupants should refrain from locking doors and windows. Also, instruct evacuees to take personal belongings. Quickly identify the individual who located the device or received the initial threat, and have him be available to answer additional questions throughout the event.

When dealing with IEDs, it is critical to respond strategically, which means you will need to spend time collecting information and coordinating the approach. If a blast has already occurred, you must make decisions based on the blast’s destruction. The first step for incident command will be to establish the hot zone, also known as the inner perimeter. The hot zone is where the event occurred and beyond where the maximum risk is. Once the hot zone is determined, establish a warm zone. The warm zone is where decontamination and mass-casualty triage activities should occur. Last, identify the cold zone. This is the outermost perimeter of the working scene and where witnesses and green-tagged victims should be located. It is important to establish a secured perimeter around all zones to control and document all who enter and exit the incident area.

Some basic safety precautions when dealing with possible explosives include not smoking inside the scene perimeter; preventing inhalation of postblast smoke, fumes, or vapors; refraining from touching or contacting devices; and eliminating the use of radio and cell phone transmissions in the evacuation exclusion area. Abstain from having all first responders gather in one location. Be aware that injured or deceased victims may have explosives embedded in their bodies; treat these individuals with extreme caution, and fully brief the receiving medical personnel.

Training for First Responders

Fire departments must establish standard operating procedures related to IED incidents, and first responders must receive the proper training to ensure personal safety. Firefighters can receive this training through several platforms from DHS’s Office for Bombing Prevention (www.dhs.gov/bombing-prevention-training-courses). These courses are available at no cost. Fire departments should also identify and establish a working relationship with their local bomb response team, know what resources are available for response to an IED incident, and create or identify opportunities to participate in tabletop or functional exercises related to an explosive incident.

References

Centers for Disease Control. (n.d.) Explosions and blast injuries: A primer for clinicians. Retrieved from www.cdc.gov/masstrauma/preparedness/primer.pdf.

Singh A, Ditkofsky N, York D, et al. Blast Injuries: From Improvised Explosive Device Blasts to the Boston Marathon Bombing. Radiographics: a review publication of the Radiological Society of North America, Inc. 36. 295-307. 10.1148/rg.2016150114.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (n.d.). Bomb standoff card. Retrieved from www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=4506.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (n.d.). IED explosive effects fundamentals. Retrieved from www.eiseverywhere.com/file_uploads/170e63337bebca0287c1aaf3509af6d2_IEDExplosiveEffectsFundamentals.pdf.

U.S. Marine Corps. Improvised explosive devices (IED) student handout. Retrived from https://www.usmcofficer.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Improvised-Explosive-Devices.pdf.

CANDICE McDONALD is a firefighter/public information officer with the Sebring (OH) Fire Department and a firefighter/former emergency medical services officer with the Winona (OH) Fire Department. She also works full-time for NASA in the Office of Protective Services as a physical security specialist/federal special agent. Prior to working at NASA, she was the program coordinator for the Research Center for Educational Technology at Kent State University, worked for seven years with the state of Ohio in marketing, and worked for 10 years as a mental health case manager and drug and alcohol counselor. McDonald is also a member of the FDIC International/Fire Engineering advisory board, a director with the Cumberland Valley Volunteer Firemen’s Association, and an iWomen volunteer trustee. She has a doctorate of business administration degree with a specialty in homeland security, a master’s degree in organizational leadership, a bachelor’s degree in organizational management, and an associate degree in health and human services.