Clarifications on fire pumps
This refers to David Blossom’s “Fire Pumps: The Invisible Firefighter” (August 2005). As a 15-plus-year member of the National Fire Protection Association Pamphlet 20 Committee and serving 30-plus years as a fire officer, I believe several inaccuracies in the article may lead to confusion or injury on the fireground and should be addressed.
Blossom states that the siamese connection is piped upstream of the fire pump. The actual position of the connection is downstream of the pump and on the system side of the check valve, which allows the pumper connected to the siamese to completely bypass the fire pump and discharge directly into the connected fire suppression systems [NFPA 20, Figure A.5.l9.1.2 (b)].
The second is his statement that the fire pump circuit breaker can be bypassed under a fire condition. This is incorrect; a firefighter can be seriously injured if he attempts to reset a circuit breaker that has tripped. The fire pump controller is designed to allow the fire pump to run to destruction. The circuit breaker protects the electrical components in case of a short circuit or an overload. If the breaker has tripped, there is a serious problem with the electrical wiring and a severe danger to anyone trying to reset it under pressure demands. The bypass on the outside of the controller is a mechanical lever that manually pushes the motor contactor in so that the pump can be started if the control circuits inside the controller are inoperable. Of course, the first method of manually starting an electrical fire pump is to press the start button on the controller. If that does not work, the manual bypass should be lifted into position. Never try to reset a fire pump circuit breaker in a fire condition.
In the section on fire department operations, there is a direction that an engine company should be connected to the fire department connection if the pump fails. The connection to a siamese should be part of the SOGs for one of the first-in engines. If the engine pumps into the connection at 150 psi, an operating fire pump most often will exceed the engine’s input, but if there is a failure of the stationary pump, the engine will immediately take over the water supply to the connected systems without interruption. After the engine takes over, the engineer can adjust the discharge pressure to accommodate the need for handlines off a standpipe or for the automatic systems.
Terence A. Manning
Lieutenant (Ret.)
Manhattan (IL) Fire Department
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On page 80, in “Fire Pumps: The Invisible Firefighter” (August 2005), author David Blossom states that fire department connections are typically connected upstream of pump intakes. Such connections are specifically prohibited from being piped to the suction side of pumps by NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems. The diagrams in both NFPA 14, Standard for the Installation of Standpipe, Private Hydrant, and Hose Systems, and NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection, show the connections on the discharge side of fire pumps.
The reason the codes require fire department connections on the discharge side of fire pumps is to preclude a dangerous overpressure condition. A fixed fire pump and a mobile fire apparatus pump working in series could boost the pressure too high for system components or fire department nozzles. If such a situation were allowed to exist, firefighters performing suppression operations could be at risk from overpressure of hoselines fed by standpipe systems or failure of standpipe or sprinkler piping.
Mat Chibbaro, P.E.
Fire Protection Engineer
Directorate of OSHA
Standards & Guidance
Washington, DC
David Blossom responds: These comments help to illustrate the point of this article. I am in full agreement with Lt. Manning’s comments; however, his comments are not necessarily correct in terms of what is actually encountered in 100 percent of fire pump installations. Because of the fact that many installations still in use have spanned the decades of code development and code changes, you will certainly encounter installations that have the features pointed out in the original article. Information on these installations from very early documents to current code requirements was presented. Unfortunately within the limits of the capability of a general article on this topic, it is impossible to address every situation and installation method that will be encountered. The current code requirements typically will be found in installations of the past 10 to 20 years.
However, to assume that this will be the situation in every pump installation would be a mistake not only in terms of the age of some systems but also in adherence to code requirements. Situations of relatively modern installations that do (and do not) meet code are not unusual. Therefore, with Manning’s comments in support of the fact that there are many factors to consider when encountering any pump installation, it is critically important that members of the fire service become familiar not only with fire pumps and their operation but also with those within their response area, whether this is through an effective prefire planning process or taking deliberate steps during the initial size-up to obtain information on the pump installation.
I completely agree that electrical safety is important. Newer controllers have many safety features. Again, the limits of one article do not allow full justice in exploration of such details. A panel with a tripped breaker should not simply be reset; however, it is important for the personnel assigned to the pump room to know what to do in such situations. You are encouraged to invite local experts on fire pump installation and operation into your department to provide training. Encourage your local fire science program to include this topic or provide a training seminar. Please take the comments in the article and the above letters, and use them not only to provide you with the knowledge you need to effectively use fire pumps but also as a stimulus to learn more and gain a better understanding of the fire protection systems in the buildings to which you are responding. This will not only help you to effectively use the fire protection systems in these properties, but this knowledge may also save your life one day.
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10 Codes reinstated
On September 27, 2005, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff announced at an International Association of Chiefs of Police meeting that “10 Codes” would be allowed under the all new NIMS program. To say the very least, I was astounded. How could emergency services personnel tolerate such a major step backward in the realm of communications? It seems we took one step forward and two steps back here.
For decades, we have preached nationwide for the usage of “clear text” in all communications. When we finally get most of the country onboard, Chertoff dismisses these efforts in a single announcement, seemingly succumbing to the wishes of the Chiefs of Police Association. We all know that 10 Codes will result in an archaic form of communication; moreover, there are no standardized 10 Codes used anywhere in the country. What’s used in one department is not necessarily used in a neighboring department. Their meanings most likely differ.
Personally, I have never understood their purpose. Do the agencies or personnel actually believe that anyone listening in on their communications doesn’t know what these codes mean? Go to any reputable bookstore, and you can purchase magazines, books, and so on deciphering almost any department’s 10 Codes.
On August 27, 2005, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recommended ending all 10 Code usage nationwide. Why the difference in policy? It’s no wonder our emergency services personnel continually fall short of their capabilities in the communications game. No one can seem to agree on HOW to communicate. Even with the best communications equipment that money can buy, if the operators don’t speak the same language, the system becomes useless. It seems once again that the fire service was either not consulted regarding this announcement or our opinions were just dismissed. It is my hope that newly appointed FEMA Director R. David Paulison can talk some sense into Secretary Chertoff. Having served as chief of the Miami-Dade (FL) Fire Department, Paulison has firsthand knowledge of unsatisfactory interagency communications.
Interoperability is the catch phrase nowadays. Everyone is rushing to buy the newest and greatest in radio equipment. As I stated before, what good is the equipment if we can’t agree on what language to use once it’s installed and operating? Maybe it’s time we went back to the basics and spoke “clearly” on the radio. This would eliminate any uncertainty as to what any 10 Codes mean, whether it be by your neighboring town, county, or state.
Dane C. Apgar
President/Safety Officer
Tuckerton (NJ) Fire Department
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“Officers’ first duty is to keep firefighters from harm”
We are faithful subscribers to Fire Engineering magazine. It continues to play a significant role in the training, development, and depth of our emergency response personnel. We always enjoy reading the articles and coming to understand the varied perspectives of our colleagues across North America.
As I read the August 2005 issue, the article, “How New Leaders Can Be Great Leaders,” by Lance C. Peeples, caught my eye. As I scanned this article, I observed the photograph in the top-right corner on page 125. I looked at the photograph and read the caption. I was in a state of disbelief!
In the article, the author says that good officers must be willing to “place themselves in harm’s way.” The photograph shows two firefighters, one apparently the company officer, attempting to ventilate the roof on an obviously well-involved structure. Where are their SCBAs? Where is their roof ladder? Where are their two points of egress?
Quite simply, this one picture captures the essence of why we continue to hurt our people. The absence of adequate personal protective equipment, tools, and procedures is unacceptable. If we want to get real about reducing firefighter injury and death, let’s get real about protecting our people.
With all due respect to the author, I strongly suggest that the number-one responsibility of each and every officer is to PREVENT our people from getting in harm’s way. The best way to do this is to lead by example. Each officer MUST ensure that his crew uses proper PPE, works in a safe manner, and recognizes danger when it presents itself. The suggestion that a “good” officer should walk alongside a firefighter into “harm’s way” is completely unacceptable.
If this photo had been taken at one of our incidents, I suspect that the officer on the roof would not have been congratulated but instead would have been explaining later why he thinks he should continue in a fireground leadership position at all. Violation of safety protocols and training is unacceptable and will not be tolerated by any of our officers.
Firefighter safety starts with company officers. As long as we continue to forget or disregard this, we will continue to attend firefighter funerals. Enough is enough. Let’s have the guts to take a leadership stand to require that all our people work safely-every time, without exception. Now, that is a good leader!
M. D. (Matt) Pegg
Deputy Chief
Ajax Fire and Emergency Services
Ontario, Canada
Editor’s Note:
In “It Is Not Okay To Die During An I-Zone Fire” (Fire Commentary, September 2005), “Northwest Coordinating Group (NWCG)” should read “National Wildfire Coordinating Group.”
