BY STUART GRANT
A four-alarm fire in the northwest part of Dallas, Texas, in September, 2005, was a near-miss for Dallas Fire-Rescue. In an instant, an apartment fire turned into a race to save one of our own. An electrical short in an air-conditioning unit on the outside of the building sparked an inferno that tested our department.
THE APARTMENT COMPLEX
The Woodland Village Apartments were built in 1970 and consisted of more than 100 units contained in a dozen apartment buildings. The buildings were of wooden platform framed construction with full 2-inch × 10-inch floor joists between the first and second floors. The attic was framed with wooden trusses held together with gusset plates or gang nailers, and the attic space in each building was common over the entire structure.
The roof consisted of composition shingles over plywood decking. The buildings had a brick veneer exterior with decorative wood accents. Several apartments in each building had fireplaces; these had a stucco exterior with wood framing and were fabricated out of metal and had a firebox and prefabricated metal flues. The fireplace created a void space from the first floor to the attic.
The downstairs units featured a patio surrounded by a wooden fence. Each upstairs unit had a balcony enclosed by a three-foot wrought iron fence. The apartments featured the kitchen, dining area, and living room on the first floor. The units also had a closet, washer/dryer connections by the kitchen, and a bathroom adjacent to the closet. The stairs to the second floor had a landing at the mid-point, resulting in a cut-back design. The upstairs consisted of a bedroom, bathroom, and closet area. The apartments had not had any renovations since they were built except for routine maintenance.
SHORT IN AC UNIT SPARKS FIRE
Sunday, September 18, 2005, dawned clear and warm as the A shift of Dallas Fire-Rescue reported to work. At 0720 hours, the first-due company for the apartments, Engine 43, was dispatched to a major accident at Lombardy and Webb Chapel. This location was approximately a mile east of their station.
As the members of Truck 43 were checking the equipment on the truck, they noticed smoke rising into the sky north of the station. The truck crew secured the equipment on the truck and started toward the smoke. Captain Larry Bassett checked with the dispatch office, which confirmed there were no reported fires in the city at that time. He told dispatch to assign his truck crew to an investigation, and they continued toward the smoke. When they were approximately halfway to the location of the smoke, at 0734 hours, the dispatch office advised Truck 43 it was receiving reports of an apartment fire and was transmitting a structure response.
Approximately 30 minutes earlier, an air conditioner electrical disconnect shorted out and started a fire on the wooden exterior of the apartments. The fire went undetected and grew in size and intensity because most of the residents were still asleep or inside their apartments and the location of the fire was out of view from the parking lot on the opposite side of the building.
The fire spread to the wooden fence around the patio of a middle apartment and went up the side of the building and into the common attic space (photo 1). Once in the attic, the fire spread from one end to the other and started burning through the plywood decking. The fire entered the middle apartment from the patio and quickly engulfed it. It then moved up the stairs to the second floor, and from the patio to the balcony above it.
 (1) Arriving companies found an apartment building with fire in the middle apartment that had spread throughout the attic. (Photos by author.) |
The radiant heat became intense on the C side of the structure, and the exposed building soon ignited. The fire in the attic had worked its way to the B end of the building and was threatening that building from radiant heat and blowing embers as well. These two buildings were connected to each other by a common stairway and balcony. Within minutes, the fire was now consuming two buildings and threatening a third. Engine 43 heard the radio transmissions to Truck 43 from Fire Dispatch, cleared from the accident, and requested to be assigned to the fire. Truck 43 arrived on location and reported a size- up of two-story apartments with two buildings on fire and requested a second alarm at 0735 hours.
Bassett assumed command and positioned the truck so that the engine companies could get into the complex. Engine 43 arrived, caught a hydrant, and straight laid a five-inch supply line into the fire. Once there, they laid two 1-3/4 inch preconnected handlines to a position between the buildings on the back side of the fire to try and contain the fire to the building of origin. Bassett had the next arriving company, Engine 35, position on the front side and lay an attack line into the burning apartments. He then had the third arriving engine, Engine 30, lay a supply line to them and then lay a backup line behind Engine 35’s crew (photo 2).
 (2) Engine 35 positioned in the front of the building and laid attack lines. Engine 30 supplied Engine 35 and also laid attack lines. |
A FRANTIC SEARCH FOR VICTIMS
While the first responders were setting up, a young girl told the firefighters on the back side of the building that she thought a mother and three children were in an apartment on the western side (D side) of the building. Immediately after this, a man ran toward the building screaming that a mom and three children were in that same apartment. Two members from Engine 43 and two members from Truck 43 donned their protective gear and entered the apartment to perform a quick primary search. Command placed a third alarm on the fire at 0746 hours. [It was later determined that the mother and three children were not in the building at the time of the fire.]
Battalion 9, Chief Harold Holland, arrived, assumed command of the fire, and had a briefing over the radio from Bassett. Simultaneously, Battalions 1 and 3 arrived and were given assignments of sectors 3 and 2, respectively. Battalion 1, Chief Terrance Lyons, coordinated the exposure fire in the second building and attempted containment of the fire to the building of origin. Division Chief 1 (806) arrived and took overall command of the fire.
Battalion 3 told Command that he would need a company for sector 2 and was assigned Engine 20. At this time, three firefighters suddenly came tumbling out of the end apartment, surprising Battalion 9, who did not know they were in the building. They looked at each other and realized they were missing a firefighter and immediately reported this to Battalion 9.
When the four firefighters from Engine 43 and Truck 43 went into the apartment to search for the reported missing family, they searched the downstairs together and then ascended the stairs. Once upstairs, they split into two teams of two. One of the teams went to the left and started searching the bathroom and the closet area. The other two went to the right and started searching the bedroom. One firefighter went to the far side of the bed with the other staying alongside the bed, between it and the dresser. While searching, the gypsum board ceiling collapsed, and fire, fed by the influx of fresh air, roared down into the apartment.
The firefighter searching between the bed and dresser was directly hit by the ceiling. This knocked him to the floor, covered him with gypsum board, and knocked off his SCBA face piece and helmet. In an attempt to redon his face piece, he removed one of his gloves (photo 3).
 (3) A firefighter’s helmet was knocked off when the ceiling collapsed on him. |
Feeling the effects of the collapse, the firefighters searching to the left scrambled back to the stairs and started down. The firefighter on the other side of the bed also scrambled to the stairs and met the other firefighters, telling them that they “had to go.” He also saw the firefighter who had been knocked down and told him to leave the building. He saw him moving and thought that he was getting up to follow him downstairs. In the resulting fire and smoke, the firefighters found their way downstairs and exited the apartment through a window and a door (photo 4). Once outside, they took their SCBA face pieces off, looked at each other, and realized they were missing one of their own crew!
 (4) After the ceiling collapse, the firefighters found their way downstairs in the smoke and heat and then realized they were missing a member. |
FINDING A MISSING FIREFIGHTER
Battalion 9 transmitted over the radio: “Missing firefighter! We have a missing firefighter on the south side of the building!” As chief of Battalion 3, I made visual contact with Command and was assigned to take Rescue sector. I told Command I was taking Engine 20 with me and that I needed the next two companies that arrived. Division 1 told Command to give me anything I needed.
We retrieved the rapid intervention team bags and proceeded to the south side of the building, which was sector 3. At this time, a fourth alarm was called. Arriving in sector 3, Battalion 3 conferred with Battalion 1 and agreed that the only place firefighters could enter was on the western end of sector 3. Battalion 3 assigned Engine 20 to search that apartment and assigned Engine 2 to provide protection with a hoseline. Battalion 3 asked over the radio if anyone knew who was missing, what company he was with, and where his last known location was. There was no answer.
Battalion 3 went around the building to sector 1 and conferred with Battalion 9, who reported the name of the firefighter, what company he was from, the apartment in which he was last seen, and where he was seen in the apartment. Battalion 3 transmitted this information over the radio and asked if anyone had seen the missing firefighter. Again, there was no answer.
Battalions 3 and 9 assigned Engine 30 to search the apartment on the north (sector 1) side of the building and Engine 35 to provide protection for them. At this point, there were crews on both sides of the building where Engine 43 was last operating in case the lost firefighter had broken through the gypsum board to the other apartment to seek refuge. Engine 20 informed Rescue sector that they had completed their search, with negative results. This was undertaken under heavy fire conditions because Engine 2’s line was too short. Engine 2’s crew moved the line outside and used it off the ceiling in a straight stream pattern to provide relief to Engine 20’s crew.
Battalion 3 moved Engine 20’s crew around to support the operations on the sector 1 side. Lieutenant Patty Krafft of Engine 30 was told that the firefighter was last seen at the top of the stairs. The missing firefighter’s crew members said: “If you go to your left to the stairs, he was at the top of them.” Engine 30 made entry, found the stairs and started up. As they got partially up the stairs, they heard a PASS device and knew it wasn’t coming from the upstairs. They reversed their direction and started a search downstairs.
SLIDING TO SAFETY
During the struggle to redon his face piece, the missing firefighter had managed to slide down the stairs on his back to the first floor. After approximately a minute of searching, Engine 30 reported that they had found the firefighter (photo 5). Battalion 3 reported that the firefighter was being removed from the building (photo 6) and requested a rescue unit to the 1-4 corner of the building. The firefighter was removed, and CPR was started immediately after his bunker gear and SCBA were removed. He had sustained inhalation and burn injuries to his face, neck, shoulders, and hand. He was transported to the burn unit at Parkland Hospital in Dallas.
 (5) The missing firefighter was located to the left of the bottom of the stairs. |
 (6) Engine 30’s personnel removed him through sliding glass doors. |
The mood was very somber at the fire scene, and the fire still had control of the original fire building. During the rescue operation, the command technicians at the command post had assigned companies to the fire operation and had kept things on track (photo 7). They had assigned company officers and later-arriving chief officers to take sector assignments and reinforced them with companies arriving on the third and fourth alarms. This built a command staff and allowed for several battalion commanders to concentrate on the rescue effort. The command technicians’ efforts allowed for an easy transition back into the sector assignments and got the company officers back with their crews.
 (7) The command technicians at the command post assigned companies to the fire operation and kept things on track during the rescue operation. |
A city bus and a critical incident stress management (CISM) team were requested at the scene to provide support. The initial plan was to put the first-alarm crews in the bus with the CISM members and take them from the scene to a fire station. These firefighters also were instructed to call their families, since the news crews were on the scene and this was being broadcast live.
As this was developing, news came from the hospital that the injured firefighter had responded to the advanced therapy provided by the on-scene firefighters and paramedics and was now awake, alert, and talking at the hospital. This put a renewed energy into everyone, and it was decided that the best thing to do for the first-alarm crews was to give them a task to accomplish, as there still was plenty to do. Later that afternoon, all companies went through a CISM debriefing and defusing.
Seven months after the fire, our injured firefighter returned to active duty at the fire station.
LESSONS LEARNED
• IC must know where each crew is working. Companies must let the incident commander know if the situation dictates a change in their assignment. Sometimes information given to a fire company requires immediate intervention. This has to be communicated to the IC so that he can change the strategy or replace the company changing assignments. Remember that companies are working for the IC. A company should change its assignment only in rare life-saving or life-threatening conditions.
• Crews should work as companies. Maintain company integrity, pairs as a minimum. The best practice is to work as companies. It is the job of the officer to keep account of his crew, and it is the job of the crew to keep up with the officer.
• Each member must have a PASS device. Each member should have and use a PASS device. It should be used every time with no exceptions. Ensure that each PASS device is functioning each shift and before entry into any building or confined space.
• Use an accountability system. Firefighters must adhere to an accountability system. No exceptions! It is the job of the officer to ensure that this happens. It is also the job of the firefighters to adopt and use the accountability system. All responding personnel must be trained on and use a consistent system. The accountability system responding departments use must be interchangeable so that there is no confusion regarding what department is there, what companies are there, and who is in those companies. The accountability system must indicate the number of personnel on the scene and their identity. Accountability should include faces, not just numbers. The incident command system will indicate where those personnel are working.
• Wear your PPE; do NOT remove it. Personnel protective equipment (PPE) protects firefighters from the elements they encounter. All PPE must be donned correctly to provide the needed protection. Training has to include donning PPE with gloves on.
• Communications. Each member should have a radio with a remote microphone. The radio should be positioned so that it is readily accessible. The microphone should be secured so that it can be heard and it does not come loose and drag around your ankles. Company officers have to give the IC an update on their progress, position, and needs. This allows the IC to compare what he is hearing with what he is seeing. Firefighters must transmit to command when they are in trouble. We cannot afford to wait and see if we get out of the building, if we are able to get untangled, or if we can make our SCBA last those last few breaths. When firefighters realize they are missing someone from their company, they must let command know the name of the firefighter and his last known location.
• Use division or group designations. When a fire scene is sectored, the operational areas should be in a logical and understandable format. Use common terminology such as groups or divisions so that all personnel working the incident understand the functional as well as the geographic areas of the fireground. Do not use slang and directions, as they lead to confusion and misdirected efforts. Adoption of the National Incident Command System (NIMS) will help with this problem.
• Rapid intervention and safety. ICs must have a committed rapid intervention team (RIT) because the fireground is a rapidly changing environment. There must be a fully equipped team available to come to a downed firefighter’s rescue. To the firefighters operating on the scene, RIT members are the most important people on the scene. NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, specifies that there should be personnel prepared to initiate rescue operations. If we can’t rescue our own, then maybe we don’t go in. “Two-in/two-out” is the minimum requirement. This should be replaced as soon as possible with a RIT. A safety officer must be assigned early. Incidents go bad early and unexpectedly. An exclusive set of eyes that has no other duties greatly enhances safety on the fireground and helps reduce firefighter injuries.
• CISM is needed. When stress gets out of control, it becomes a destructive force that has a devastating impact on our health, our personalities, our jobs, and our families. A critical incident stress debriefing is an organized approach to supporting personnel to assist them in mitigating long-term effects, promoting recovery, expediting return to duty, and preventing stress trauma syndromes. A debriefing provides a format in which personnel can discuss their thoughts, reactions, feelings, and concerns. As a result, it reduces the stresses they may be feeling from the exposure to critical incidents.
STUART GRANT, a 27-year veteran of the fire service, is a battalion chief with Dallas (TX) Fire-Rescue. He is certified as a master firefighter with the Texas Commission on Fire Protection. He has served in many capacities within the department, including academy commander, haz mat officer, paramedic, and rope rescue member. He has been a H.O.T. instructor and speaker at FDIC and an instructor at Collin County Community College in McKinney, TX, and at the Texas A&M University Municipal Fire School.
