NIGHT INTO DAY: THE EDISON, NEW JERSEY, GAS PIPELINE EXPLOSION

NIGHT INTO DAY: THE EDISON, NEW JERSEY, GAS PIPELINE EXPLOSION

BY ALBERT J. LAMKIE AND DAVID DAVIS

At 2357 hours on March 23, 1994, a 36-inch Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation (TETCO) natural gas transmission pipeline, operating at 975 psi, catastrophically ruptured in Edison Township, New Jersey, initiating a fire event of enormous magnitude, the largest fire incident ever to occur in Middlesex County.

The 80-foot-long rupture in the pipe occurred on property occupied by the Quality Materials, Inc. asphalt plant and ripped a crater approximately 100 feet long, 50 feet wide, and 40 feet deep. This sent a shower of bedrock and shale, some pieces the size of bowling balls, as far as 800 feet in all directions. A 40-foot section of ruptured pipeline was hurled 350 feet by the blast. At the Durham Woods apartments complex, debris smashed through windows and roofs, breaking tables, knocking kitchen cabinets off the walls, and, in one case, breaking a man?s leg as he lay in bed.

Between 60 and 90 seconds after rupture, the escaping high-pressure gas ignited, sending a giant fireball 500 feet into the air, turning night into day. Some residents looked out of their patio doors and saw their plastic lawn furniture beginning to melt. In just a short time at Durham Woods apartments, the exteriors of buildings closest to the fire began to burn, and one resident reported that his interior walls were Ostarting to smoke.O By the time the first fire unit arrived at the complex, just minutes after the explosion, Building 12 already was fully involved.

From the onset of the incident, the township?s dispatch center operated at total capacity (overload) for 33 minutes. In the first 15 minutes, 25,000 calls were placed through the two telephone switching stations serving Edison. During the first hour of the fire, 200,000 calls were made through those stations.

BACKGROUND

Edison Township, located in central New Jersey, has a residential population of 100,000 that swells to 250,000 during business days. The Edison Division of Fire is a combination fire department with six stations spread over the township?s 32 square miles. The division has 117 career members and 120 volunteers, manning 13 engines, two aerial apparatus, and a rescue vehicle.

The TETCO natural gas transmission line was installed in the Edison area in 1961 and 1962. The line spans 1.8 miles across Edison Township. At the Quality Materials site, the pipeline bury depth was 15 feet. It is believed that sometime between then and the rupture, excavation equipment had gouged and weakened the pipe.

The ambient temperature on the night of March 23, prior to the blast, was 50!F. Winds were from the west at about three to five mph.

RESPONSE

Chief Albert Lamkie was at his home when the blast occurred. He walked out his door and looked at the fireball: It appeared to him to be no more than two blocks away, but in reality it was four miles from his house. The giant torch was immense. Every fire company in Middlesex County received calls from residents reporting the fire as being in their townships. The City of New York (NY) Fire Department received calls from residents in Manhattan borough, some 35 miles from the blast, who thought the fire was in their vicinity. Some 65 miles away in the Pocono Mountains of Pennsylvania, eight fire companies responded to a glare in the sky that their members thought was a barn fire. An Edison patrol officer radioed that a nearby oil refinery Ojust blew up.O

Because of the numerous reports of contradictory locations of the fire, all volunteer companies were called to stations. On-duty career engine companies from three stations immediately responded in the direction of the fire. The normal alarm assignments were bypassed and the equivalent of a third alarm was immediately called by the first-arriving officer.

Members established a command post approximately one-half mile from the fire. Lamkie responded to that location. The radiant heat was so intense that his first order was to move the command post three-quarters of a mile farther away from the fire.

From the command post vantage point south of the fire, it appeared that the under-construction but partially occupied Edison Tyler Estates condominium complex was closest to the blast. Engine Company 4 was directed to cross over Interstate 287 to that location, passing the fire as they did so. These members identified the origin of the fire on the way to their objective and requested that TETCO be notified to shut off the valve to the pipeline.

At 0005 hours, TETCO operators in Lambertville, New Jersey, about 40 miles southwest of the incident, and in Houston, Texas, realized from their monitoring equipment that there was a Olow suction pressureO/compressor problem at their unmanned Linden plant, 10 miles east of the rupture. Two minutes later, the Lambertville station operator noticed the fireball in the sky. Company maintenance personnel assigned to the Edison area were sent to the scene, after this 10-minute delay from time of rupture. They reported to field fire units their presence and efforts to shut off the gas. The fire units relayed that message to command, moving to Brunswick Avenue and Talmadge Road.

As the command post was being reestablished, a member of the Middlesex County Mutual Aid Fire Coordinators Office, driv-ing by the area on I-287 when the fireball erupted, reported in and offered assistance. Realizing that the magnitude of the incident was well beyond the capabilities of the Edison Division of Fire and contiguous mutual aid, Lamkie directed him to set up a staging area at a local restaurant about three-quarters of a mile from the command post.

Lamkie split the fire scene into three operational divisions: the Village Gate section of the Edison Tyler Estates condominium complex; the asphalt plant; and the Durham Woods apartments complex. At Village Gate, members evacuated the residents and extinguished fires in construction debris around unfinished buildings closer to the fire. The second division, the asphalt plant itself, was unapproachable at this time due to the intensity of the fire.

In the Durham Woods complex, apartments were burning?the structure in that complex nearest to the fireball was only 350 feet away. Engine Company 1, responding to that location as a Osecond-alarmO company, was met by residents fleeing the complex, who told the officer that several buildings were on fire. The lieutenant reported this and proceeded into the complex with a rescue company. On arrival, Engine 1 radioed a quick report of multiple structure fires and a request for more help. Then the members set up for defensive master stream operations while rescue personnel and volunteer firefighters on the scene conducted a quick primary search of buildings they could reach. Lamkie directed Captain David Davis to take command of this division.

STOPPING THE FLOW

The Middlesex County Hazardous Materials Unit, commanded by Chief Richard Kozub, reported to the command post, and Lamkie placed Kozub in charge of the second (asphalt plant) division. Kozub?s first responsibility was to shut off the flow of natural gas at the upstream valve closest to the rupture. TETCO workers already were shutting off a valve approximately five miles downstream, as per their protocol. Kozub and his team set to work on the upstream valve, approximately 1,800 feet from the fireball.

The valves on this pipeline normally operate in Opower assistO mode, in which the gas pressure powers a small motor that opens and closes the valve. Normally, it is a seven- to 10-minute procedure. This night, unfortunately, the rupture had reduced pressure in the line such that the valve would not automatically turn. However, even if there had been sufficient pressure, firefighters were concerned that the natural gas vented off from this valve during the automatic valve-closing procedure would be ignited by the intense heat from the fireball.

Kozub?s unit, assisted by a mutual-aid company from the South Plainfield Fire Department and TETCO employees had to close the valve manually. The firefighters, in four- or five-member shifts, took turns on the four-foot-diameter handwheel, moving it six to eight inches at a pull against the flow of gas through the line. The heat was such that the reflective material on their turnouts burned away and the bottoms of their fire boots melted. It took 752 turns and 21U2 hours to close the valve.

OPERATIONAL NEEDS

Lamkie addressed his most pressing operational needs in this rapidly unfolding incident. The fires and mass evacuation of the Durham Woods apartments?a complex of 63 two- and three-story, wood-frame buildings?held equal priority with achieving pipeline product shutoff.

While the fire department conducted primary searches and started water on the fires, police assisted in the evacuation of the 1,500 residents (some who had to be encouraged to move). Meanwhile, EMS established a forward triage at a nearby hotel. The injured were ferried to that location, for transport, if necessary, to local hospitals. Many of the residents, some injured, fled on foot, as their cars were either destroyed or the radiant heat made them too hot to touch.

Of critical concern were water supply deficiencies hindering the streams at Durham Woods. Only one main fed the entire complex, and the explosion had downed electric power lines feeding the Edison Township Water Utilities pumping station located only a few hundred yards away. Utility personnel were transported past the fireball to the pumping station to manually start diesel pumps and increase water pressure. Lamkie designated Captain Robert Ambrosio as water supply officer and directed him to establish a relay system for adequate water supply to the complex.

OSecondaryO hazards were in abundance. Lamkie directed Public Service Electric and Gas to address the many downed power lines in the area and to shut off the flow of gas into the apartments north of Reading Road. He contacted Conrail to close the freight rail line running just north of the rupture and the Durham Woods complex. But two problems required pipeline shutoff before they could be abated or addressed: the haz-mat fires and potential BLEVEs from stored product in the asphalt plant; and two product pipelines on the other side of the railroad right-of-way, only 100 feet from the TETCO line rupture?more specifically, a 16-inch-diameter gasoline pipeline at 700 psi and a 12-inch-diameter line carrying light heating oil. The operator of these lines, Buckeye Pipe Line Company, was contacted and the lines were shut down as a precautionary measure.

During the 21U2 hours before the ruptured pipeline was completely shut down, the noise level from the escaping gas, even at the command post, made radio communications unrecognizable. The department?s communications van offered no refuge from the noise. Firefighters, driven in police cars, delivered messages to and from field units and the command post. These runners were successful, given the fact that Lamkie was able to call into play sufficient resources from the mutual-aid staging area to effect adequate water supply, bring necessary suppression units to Durham Woods, call on required medical resources, shut off the gas pipeline supply, and perform a variety of other functions. In all, 36 mutual-aid companies responded to the staging area on the request of Middlesex County and local emergency managers. Jursidictional re-sponse from the Edison Division of Fire was six engines, one ladder, and a rescue company. Eleven engine companies, four ladder companies, two rescue companies, and the county haz-mat agency (with its entire fleet of specialty apparatus and support vehicles) were called and utilized at the incident. Numerous other utility and support units also were used.

Throughout the operation, the township?s public information officer, at the command post, handled the media. This individual held regular briefings and allowed limited access to commanders/responders as dictated by the IC. This satisfied the media until daylight. It allowed Lamkie to concentrate on fulfilling the operational needs of his firefighters and the multijurisdictional command response to the incident.

DURHAM WOODS OPERATIONS

Engine 1, the first-arriving engine company at the Durham Woods complex, immediately set up for defensive operations, using a ground monitor to protect Building 8, on the west side of the complex. The quick primary search of all burning/exposed buildings?with the exception of Building 12, which was untenable?was completed and proved negative.

Davis entered the complex with Engine 11 and proceeded to the north side. There, Engine 11 personnel started a second ground master stream to protect Building 25. Firefighters now were flanking the fires.

Within a short time, the intense radiant heat from the fireball had ignited eight buildings (9, 10, 11, 12, 20, 21, 22, and 24), which severly exposed six additional buildings (7, 8, 16, 19, 23, and 25). The buildings? lightweight wood-truss roof construction, combustible exterior, open stair shafts, and wood balconies aided rapid fire extension. In addition, fire walls, where constructed, did not perform their intended function, as they did not extend to the roof line.

Davis informed command of the growing fires and requested immediate additional resources.

A truck company and engine company were received in short order. Davis directed these members to set up an aerial master stream to protect Building 7. In addition, they set up a third ground monitor, operating only on hydrant pressure, to protect Building 16. It was along this line?just 800 feet from the unrelenting gas fire?that they would make their stand.

Davis had made an important decision: Given the available resources and the heavy fire load, he knew he could not control the fires in already involved buildings. Rather, he established Oaggressive defensiveO positions, determined by available apparatus, water supply, and position of the buildings, such that fire units could operate their streams from tenable positions onto surfaces that would save the most property. The completion of a primary search?albeit hasty?of all threatened/burning buildings (except one) early in this operation was important to the decision-making process because it gave the division commander the confidence to proceed defensively with reasonable assurance that they were not Ogiving upO on buildings containing life hazards. The strategy utilized manned streams that were moved and adjusted for coverage. Water pressure was poor during initial stages. Normally, static water pressure in the system is 65 to 70 psi. An eight-inch water main, supplied by an eight-inch feed coming from a 12-inch main at the complex entrance, is looped throughout the complex. The supply capability of the municipal water system is more than 2,500 gpm. Despite the poor pressure this night, firefighters now had water flowing on four of the five exposures and were making headway.

Davis spotted a mutual-aid ladder company from the New Market Fire Department to protect buildings 19 and 23. In initial stages, this unit operated directly off a hydrant. With several companies operating over a relatively wide area, Davis divided this division into three sectors?west flank, center, and north side. Each sector commander communicated his needs and reports to Chief Lamkie at the command post.

Water Supply Officer Ambrosio arrived at Durham Woods and established two relays into the complex: The first was stretched along the entrance road to supply Engine 1, using approximately 2,500 feet of five-inch-diameter hose from a reliable Edison Township hydrant; the second consisted of five-inch hose stretched 4,100 feet along the Conrail line into the borough of Metuchen, so as to secure a separate water utility source. This second line supplied the north side sector. Each of these lines flowed approximately 1,000 to 1,500 gpm. A third relay was begun but ultimately was not required.

Davis requested additional resources. A Colonia Fire Department ladder company, a New Market engine company, and an Edison engine company were delivered to the scene. Davis directed these companies to operate on the north side of the burn. There now were three aerial apparatus and five engine companies working on the Durham Woods exposures.

It became apparent to Davis that the lead time for units to respond from the staging area would be too great if companies were needed quickly. Therefore, he designated a location inside the complex to serve as a forward staging area for two pumpers and a ladder in the event that conditions deteriorated rapidly. Fortunately, conditions did not?within 45 minutes, firefighters knocked down the fires at Durham Woods. They then were directed to maintain their defensive positions and continue exposure protection against the still-blistering heat. Despite heavy charring on some exterior portions of exposures, the firefighters held. The time was approximately 0045 hours.

SHUTDOWN

About 30 minutes into the operation, the downstream valve five miles from the rupture was closed. However, this had no effect on the flame height or intensity. TETCO personnel now began to close a third valve, seven miles upstream. It was more than two hours?when the nearest valve was shut off by personnel from the Oasphalt plantO division and residual gas had burned off?before the flames subsided to a point where further fire spread was not anticipated. During that time, personnel at Durham Woods were rotated into and out of the complex on a regular basis. Those on apparatus and lines directly exposed to the intense heat, noise, and blinding light were relieved to sheltered areas inside the complex.

The fire-rescue van was set up as an EMS station and manned by firefighter/EMTs to monitor the condition of personnel. A temporary triage area for examination of personnel rotated out of duty was established in a vacant office near the command post. The conditions near the gas flare included very low humidity, which in addition to high heat and stress caused personnel to begin to dehydrate. EMTs were assigned to patrol the operating companies to observe the physical and emotional state of the members. Police units were dispatched to local food warehouses to procure bottled water and juices to rehydrate the firefighters. This began an unanticipated outpouring of aid from the surrounding community and industry; literally dozens of individuals and companies donated resources to the efforts of emergency personnel. Five firefighters were transported to local hospitals to be examined for exhaustion and stress. All were released by the next morning.

TETCO closed the valve seven miles upstream. This reduced flame height at the rupture to 100 feet. By 0230 hours, the teams of firefighters at the nearest valve completed the last of their 752 turns. There was, however, still more fire to be fought.

HAZ-MAT INCIDENTS

Members of the asphalt plant division proceeded to the plant itself, where Kozub led his teams?his haz-mat units plus three engines and a ladder company?to mitigate the on-going haz-mat prob-lems left in the aftermath of the explosion. Ignited residual product still was issuing from the hole. Kozub?s general plan held four main points: Conduct an initial risk assessment; learn what was burning/threatening in the plant; conduct a primary search of the plant; and aggressively attack/mitigate incidents or potential incidents if possible.

From plant management, they ascertained that the primary stored hazardous materials were propane, acetylene gas, asphalt, and fuel oil. There were numerous structure and haz-mat fires in the plant. Firefighters grabbed a hydrant in South Plainfield and stretched 1,000 feet of five-inch supply hose to the scene. They entered the facility, knocking down driveway fires (ordinary combustibles) and fire in a truck scale mechanism as they did so.

Live wires were down throughout the plant. Burning hot rock shards turned fire boots gooey. Some tanks had split open, but others remained intact, creating a serious potential for a BLEVE or explosion.

Command adopted an attack/mitigation strategy because it was unknown if the plant was occupied and firefighters still were working in the Durham Woods apartments, just a short distance across the earth berm separating the complex from the plant. It was essential, however, that the fewest possible personnel be exposed in accomplishing this aggressive strategy.

The team moved quickly through the complex, making quick assessments of each individual haz-mat situation. Suppression personnel were instructed to determine the fire/explosion potential in each case; if limited or nonexistent, they were to move on to the next problem. Where a BLEVE/explosion potential existed, cooling fog streams were employed from remote locations. The water shattered the hot rocks all over the ground, creating a projectile hazard to personnel. Other members conducted a primary search of the premises, which proved negative. Plugging, patching, and containment operations were begun.

Fire was literally all around them. The largest of these fires?in a 20,000-gallon tank containing #2 fuel oil?was knocked down with foam brought to the site by a nearby industrial brigade, and the spillage and runoff were diked and contained. Haz-mat and fire units remained on the scene for almost three full days during the cleanup and recovery phase.

The asphalt plant in essence presented responders with 26 individual haz-mat incidents rolled into one. Any one of the OindividualO incidents in themselves would have required a significant emergency response on any other day. The asphalt plant operation was a difficult response made all the more difficult by the heat stress factor, but it was accomplished successfully without major injuries to personnel.

OVERHAUL AND SECONDARY SEARCH

Whole the valves were closed and the gas flame subsided by degree, crews continued to apply streams to the smoldering ruins of Durham Woods. Lamkie toured the area at 0630 hours and ordered all first-in units out of the complex, to be replaced by recalled and mutual-aid personnel.

Overhaul and an extensive, thorough secondary search were conducted in the eight destroyed apartment buildings and surrounding areas, which included 250 totally destroyed vehicles. Trained canines were brought to the scene by various search teams, including a U.S. Army cadaver search team.

Using tenant lists provided by Durham Woods management, Edison Emergency Management personnel accounted for residents at the scene, at EMS triage, and at the high school emergency shelter. However, many residents fled without confirming their escape with authorities, and tenant lists were inaccurate due to subleasing. Later, the media assisted by broadcasting requests for outstanding Durham Woods residents to check in at the Disaster Assistance Center, set up in the Durham Woods complex.

During the search for possible fatalities, media access was denied except for scheduled briefings. Still, some reporters strayed and accessed the site. Marker flags placed by utility companies were mistaken for body locations, causing a flood of media demands for more information. Rather than allow the press to distribute misinformation, command allowed pools of print, radio, and television reporters to be escorted by fire, police, and public information officers to the fire scene.

Local, county, and state officials were at the scene and command post from early in the incident and were continually informed of incident progress. Governor Christine Todd Whitman visited the site on the afternoon of March 24. State and county emergency management officials participated in response and long-term recovery.

The canine search teams combing the debris located charred meat, diaper pails, and deceased pets. Fortunately, there were no human remains in the wreckage.

CIVILIAN INJURIES

Thousands of residents from Tyler Estates and Durham Woods were evacuated. Twenty-nine residents of Durham Woods were transported to area hospitals. Approximately 70 more traveled to hospitals or private physicians under their own power. Most injuries (all but two: broken leg and smoke inhalation) were minor (predominantly cuts and minor foot burns); but the potential for severe injuries was great, given the nature of the incident and ensuing chaos at Durham Woods (some residents jumped from upper balconies to escape their burning apartments). There was only one fatal injury associated with the incident: A woman who lived about a mile away from the blast saw the fireball and died of a heart attack.

POSTINCIDENT INVESTIGATION

The incident was investigated by federal, state, and local agencies. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted its own official investigation and compiled a report of its findings.

Sometime between 1986 and the rupture, the pipeline was gouged by excavation equipment. This created a two-inch-long dent that reduced the wall thickness of the pipe from 0.675 to 0.5 inches. Over time, metal fatigue probably caused a crack in the gouge, which in all likelihood grew to critical size, ending in the brittle catastrophic failure that released approximately 297 million standard cubic feet of natural gas over a 21U2-hour period.

The force of the rupture was sufficient to bend the railroad track running just north of the railroad; the heat from the fireball was enough to char railroad ties about 1,500 feet from the rupture in one direction and melt window caulking and venetian blinds about 1,500 feet in another direction. Eight structures containing 125 units in Durham Woods were totally incinerated. Damage from the Edison gas explosion exceeded $25 million.

The NTSB uncovered numerous inadequacies with respect to pipeline safety practices in this densely populated area. These inadequacies include the pipe material itself, pipeline marking, surveillance procedures, damage prevention programs, rapid detection and shutdown, internal inspections, and land use management.

NTSB postincident recommendations included

Y requirements for in-stalling automatic or remote-operated mainline valves on high-pressure lines in densely populated areas;

Y OtoughnessO standards for pipelines installed in urban areas;

Y marking system re-quirements for pipelines in these areas;

Y creating a more aggressive and effective public education pipeline safety program; and

Y more closely monitoring and documenting all excavations near pipelines.

The NTSB calls on a variety of federal, industry, and municipal management organizations to cooperate in achieving its recommendations. The International City/ County Management Association is included among this group to assist in these efforts.

FIVE WEEKS LATER

Five weeks after the incident, Edison flirted with another gas transmission line failure that would have made the 1994 explosion seem like a cap gun by comparison: A downed, live power line arced down through the earth to within two feet of the transmission pipeline, within just a few feet of two other transmission lines. A mere 320 feet from that location were six 30,000-gallon propane tanks.

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

Y As a result of this incident, we in Edison and surrounding communities have a much healthier appreciation for the force and potential of catastrophic transmission line ruptures. The fire department must work with and encourage municipal administrators to be proactive in their commitment to community pipeline safety/education programs. Since the fire department ultimately will be the lead agency in responding to transmission line product explosions, it behooves fire service management to keep abreast of pipeline developments and safety issues in their jurisdictions.

Y Although the NTSB reported that TETCO surpassed many federal regulations at the time of the explosion, its lack of automatic- or remote-operated valves on the transmission line prevented rapid shutdown and contributed to the damage at Durham Woods. Rapid shutdown mechanisms are absolutely essential in heavily populated areas.

Y The ICS works and is essential to handling a large-scale incident, but it should be practiced for all incidents, regardless of their size. During the OBig OneO is not the time to be experimenting with a new command system.

Y Your relationships with other local agencies is critical to a smooth-running ICS. Get to know all the players on a first-name basis ahead of time. Conduct multiagency drills.

Y Carefully monitor firefighters subjected to severe heat and stress during large-scale incidents. Establish a sufficient manpower pool whereby firefighters can be rotated in and out of duty. Plan for adequate rehab resources. Medical checks of personnel are important. At this incident, EMS command designated roving medical personnel to check the physical and mental condition of fire line personnel.

Y The decision to go defensive from the outset in Durham Woods was critical to limiting the mass destruction there. Suppression officers must know their limitations, based on fire load, percent of involvement, available/expected resources, water supply, etc. An ongoing risk-benefit assessment is essential. The decision to assume defensive yet aggressive positions within an operational Ocomfort zoneO minimized uncontrollable fire spread; had firefighters initially tried to attack that which could not be extinguished, much more of the complex would have burned down.

Y Ladder towers proved more advantageous in exposure protection at this incident than aerial ladders. Ladder towers provided extended reach between and over structures. Many surfaces of buildings that needed to be wet down were off roadways or closely spaced (as tight as 25 feet). The ability to direct streams side-to-side was an advantage in this operation.

Y The water supply officer had at one point ordered a third relay established. As this operation began, conditions improved enough to have it ordered shut down and taken up. Due to a miscommunication, another relay was shut down instead. Had the relays been given some sort of designation?a color code or name?this would not have been a problem.

Y As the operation became under control, there was a marked increase in radio traffic between portable units. During the height of the fire, runners were utilized to communicate between sectors, due to the high noise level from the fire and to reduce radio traffic. Also, with many mutual-aid units on the scene, radio contact between them was not always possible. Establishing a communications officer to coordinate and maintain radio discipline would have been most helpful.

Y With three Durham Woods sectors and manageable span of control, freelancing was kept to a minimum but did occur. Not all responding companies employed a personnel accountability system, and those that did used different systems. New Jersey PEOSH (state OSHA) dictates that the host employer?in this case, Edison Township?is responsible for the safety of Ooutside contractors,O or mutual-aid companies. Fire jurisdictions, whether under state or federal OSHA regulation, who employ mutual aid must be aware the regulations and take adequate precautions for the safety of outside companies.

Y An aggressive strategy for handling the haz-mat situations in the asphalt plant was a calculated risk based on multiple factors, not the least being the experience and training of haz-mat unit members. Again: risk-benefit analysis. The division commander was correct in realizing that potential propane BLEVEs or acetylene explosions presented a large risk to the life hazard?the responders?at Durham Woods, just a short distance across the berm. He was also correct in limiting the number of personnel operating in the plant.

Y Designating an individual to handle the media was essential to the IC?s ability to focus on operations without major distractions. The PIO should accommodate the press as much as possible without negatively affecting operations or safety.

Y The fire and building departments must ensure, during the construction phase of multiple-housing projects, that fire walls and other passive fire protection features are built such that they perform as they are intended to.

Y Diesel generators at the water pumping stations were a critical redundancy when power lines went down.

Y The IC must address limited accesss/ egress to large residential complexes. In this case, firefighters had to Ofight upstreamO against a mass of fleeing humanity. The police force is an important factor in helping to get firefighters to where they are needed.

Y In situations with very low water pressure, fire departments should use the appropriate equipment?smooth-bore nozzles?to achieve maximum stream effectiveness.

Y Even departments with normally excellent municipal water supply systems should train periodically with mutual-aid neighbors in water relay tactics and procedures. n

(Photo by Bill Tompkins.)

(Photo by Steven Spak.)

A view of the crater, from the air to ground zero. The intense blast scattered debris over an 800-foot radius. Within 60 to 90 seconds of the rupture, flame heights reached 500 feet. Note in the photo (left) the proximity of product tanks to the rupture hole. The photo (below right) shows the upstream side of the rupture, which blew out an 80-foot section of pipe. (Photos courtesy of Edison Police Bureau of Criminal Investigation.)

Top of photo–Durham Woods; middle–asphalt plant; center, left–Tyler Estates/Village Gate; right–Interstate 287. (Photo courtesy of Edison Police Bureau of Criminal Investigation.)

It was the firefighters who supplied the power for this “power assist” valve–752 turns and 212 hours worth of power. (Photo by David Davis.)

In addition to the heavy fire load, hazards included numerous hazardous materials stored at the asphalt plant : downed electrical power lines; a railroad line that had to be shut down (the train wouldn`t have gotten very far, however, given the blast damage to the track); two other product transmission lines on the other side of the railroad right-of-way. (Photos courtesy of Edison Police Bureau of Criminal Investigation.)

The bulk of the fire in Durham Woods was knocked down in a remarkable 45 minutes. However, units continued to apply water on exposures and the super-hot burned areas until daybreak. Eight buildings were incinerated, but the aggressive defensive strategy worked to save the rest of the complex. Note in the photo (lower right) the exterior charring on an exposure that was saved. (Photo top left by Pete Danzo; other photos courtesy of Edison Police Bureau of Criminal Investigation.)

Come morning, after the incinerated areas were cooled down, members conducted an intensive secondary search for victims. Search dog teams were called in. Amazingly, there were no victims to be found. (Photos courtesy of Edison Police Bureau of Criminal Investigation.)

Had the rupture occurred at a different time of day–when this playground may have been filled with children–responders would have been faced with an entirely different situation. (Photo courtesy of Edison Police Bureau of Criminal Investigation.)