Operations in Tower 2
At 1218 hours on February 26, 1993, the occupants of the World Trade Center (WTC) Tower 2 knew immediately, from the concussion of the explosion, “that something had happened.” Moments after the building shook, a light to moderate smoke condition began to develop on all floors, as smoke from the explosion and fires contaminated the tower through elevator shafts and other natural channels. Most of the approximately 25,000 tower occupants did what people do w hen they feel they may be trapped in a burning building: They tried to leave the building.
I nfortunately, a number of people on that day either forgot about or ignored the elevator warning signs and entered the elevators in an attempt to escape. Within a very few minutes of the first signs of smoke, low er 2 had a partial power failure — elevators and emergency communication and ventilation systems went down, and portions of the building lost lighting. The occupants who had made it into the elevators were trapped; some would be trapped in those prisons for as long as 11 hours. While there was confinement, terror, and discomfort within these elevators, there fortunately were no serious injuries or fatalities. Had there been a working fire on a lower floor in Tower 2, the death toll may have been in the hundreds.
I was working a day tour in the 12th Division (borough of Brooklyn) on the day of the explosion. The 12th Division was directed by Brooklyn Communications to respond to the W TC complex. Tower 2, at approximately 1250 hours.
The enormity of the event was immediately evident on arrival. From every point of view, hundreds of people were either ly ing on the ground, sitting on sidewalks, or wandering around in a state of confusion. Too numerous to count were New York City EMS. police, and fire vehicles throughout the streets. Many of the lobby w indow’s of Tower 2 had been broken out by firefighters, and a light smoke condition existed throughout the large lobby area. Numerous people were lying on the lobby floor. Some were being treated by EMS personnel, some by other civilians, while others were still unattended. Hundreds of people in various states of trauma were exiting the stairw ays. Streetlight was the only light for the lobby area, adding to the eeriness of the scene.
The only good sensed or felt on arrival was that whatever had caused all of this havoc w as over with —it had done its damage. In Tower 2, there was no fire to control, and the smoke condition on upper floors improved dramatically as below-grade fires were extinguished about an hour into the operation. Locating, treating, and removing the injured and trapped victims constituted the incident.
Deputy Chief Joseph Mills of the 11 th Division also was assigned to Tower 2. Chief Mills asked me to assume the lobby command position in Tower 2 while he operated on the upper floors as the operations chief.
The most immediate problem was treating the unattended civilians in the lobby area. Horizontal ventilation of the lobby early in the operation relieved conditions considerably, producing a very workable area for triage and treatment for those who had selfevacuated to the lobby. With the arrival of additional EMS personnel, this was soon effected. We also were receiving reports that numerous people on various floors were suffering possible heart and asthma attacks and that at least two women were in labor, one of them reported to be hemorrhaging on the 98th floor. This woman was brought to the roof and removed by a NYPD helicopter.
I contacted the ranking EMS officer in the lobby and asked him to establish a triage center on the 34th floor. The 34th floor was chosen because one of our fire units reported it to be an open floor with good outside lighting.
A male occupant fell while descending the stairs on the 68th floor and broke his leg. He first was carried to and treated at triage and then chaircarried to the lobby for removal to the hospital.
A fire unit also reported that more than a hundred civilians, many of them young children, were on the 107th-floor observation deck. Having been previously informed that electricity for the elevators might not be restored for a number of hours, if not days, the units were instructed to remove the civilians by stairway. During the removal, which took more than two hours, additional fire personnel were stationed throughout the stairwell to provide lighting and support to the children evacuating.
The number and configuration of stairways in Tower 2 were essentially the same as those in Tower 1: There were three stairways, one of which traveled the length of the building and two of which terminated (or began) at the mezzanine level. But, unlike Tower 1, the smoke condition in Tower 2 was not so severe that occupants could not find exterior doors once they reached the mezzanine level.
SEARCH AND REMOVAL
The major problem for search and removal in lower 2 during this incident was the trapped elevator occupants. There were 99 elevator cars in the tower; almost two-thirds of them traveled through blind shafts. All the elevators had to be searched, and there were no elevators located at the lobby when power went down. One of the FDNY members performing search and evacuation of the elevators in Tower 2 was Lieutenant James Sherwood, an off-duty firefighter who had volunteered his services. While performing this duty, he became aware of an occupied elevator within a blind shaft on the 42nd floor, at approximately 1730 hours. He searched around the core of the building at each floor, tapping on the walls and calling out for a possible response. When he received a response on the 42nd floor, he informed the “voice” that he would soon have him out. The lieutenant asked how many were in the elevator. The response was 72, most of them schoolchildren ages five and six.
Having carried a maul during his search, the lieutenant was able to breach a small hole in the wall and to see a small portion of the top of the elevator ear. He could make out the forms of numerous people in the car. He passed his flashlight into the car and then widened the hole so that he could enter the shaft onto the top of the elevator car. When on the car, he realized he was next to an open adjacent shaftway—if he fell, it would be a 42-story fall. He opened the elevator car’s hatchway, reached down, and began to pull children up one by one. He passed the children to Port Authority police officers, who now were on the other side of the wall. After 12 of the children had been removed, the elevator car began to slowly descend without notice; power to one elevator bank was restored, and elevator personnel were bringing down the car. The lieutenant climbed into the elevator car to calm the now very fearful occupants. After a number of panic-filled minutes, the elevator car reached the lobby, and the occupants finally were removed to awaiting EMS personnel. The lieutenant has been recommended to the NYC Fire Department’s Board of Merit for a commendation.
During the entire operation in Tower 2, FDNY operated with several battalion chiefs and 27 companies. While the search-and-rescue challenges in Tower 2 were indeed significant and sizable, fewer firefighters were required for this tower, as compared with Tower 1, because, as noted, the smoke condition in Tower 2 did not present an urgent, life-threatening situation. At 1800 hours with the change of tour, seven fresh truck companies were special-called to Tower 2 to relieve the day-tour units. These units were special-called for relief, to continue initial search and evacuation, and to perform a secondary’ search of all floors. With power restored to some of the elevators at approximately 1800 hours, we were able to send fresh units to the 50th floor by elevator. We also were able to procure master floor/office keys for entry into locked offices. The remainder of the search, while exhausting, went relatively smoothly. The last elevator occupants were found and removed at approximately 2300 hours, almost 11 hours after the beginning of the incident.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
- At any high-rise incident, once occupants begin to self-evacuate, it is almost impossible to stop them without good communication to the floors and stairways. Occupants terrified for their lives will not readily listen to instructions to stop their exiting— which they truly believe will save their lives. Even if reversing self-evacuation were possible, fire department assessment of the extent of damage to vital building systems and the probability or improbability of restoring services within a reasonable time must factor into the decision. Unless absolutely necessary to protect life, it is advisable to assist (emergency personnel presence) in this self-evacuation to alleviate panic and to remove occupants from the stairways and building as soon as possible.
Once building occupants reach the lobby, the noise from these occupants will interfere w ith the incident management. (For those who make it down safely, extreme tension easily gives way to an almost festive mood.) In large-lobby buildings, remove the occupants to a distant part of the lobby, away from the lobby command post. In smaller-lobby buildings, remove the occupants to the outside if breaking glass and weather are not issues of concern.
- At all high-rise incidents involving evacuations, the incident commander and sector officers must maintain stairway control, using them to the fullest advantage. There was no fire in the towers at this incident, so designating “attack stairs” and “search-andevacuation stairs” was not necessary; however, command directed companies to specific stairways to provide maximum coverage during the search effort and. based on communications with upper-floor officers, to address particular rescue problems in the most expedient manner. Personnel
- resources must be such that sectoring of officers achieves stairway control.
- Common sense dictates that when units are special-called to highrise buildings for search and evacuation under nonfire conditions (relief units at this incident), they should be advised in quarters, via command order through dispatch, to respond w ith street shoes. A 30-, 60-, or 90-story climb will tax even the best-conditioned firefighters, and reducing the weight carried by firefighters will cut down on injuries and enhance the operation. Seven-pound boots translate to 35 pounds of “back weight.”
- As in any fire operation, a secondary search of all areas of the building must be made by fresh units to ensure that all occupants have been found, treated if necessary, and then removed from the building. When possible, these units should be provided with master keys to facilitate this secondary search, if these keys were not made available to the initial unit(s).
- The natural chaos at an incident of this magnitude will work against an incident commander’s ability to plan ahead for potential problems involving personnel from other agencies. Every effort must be made to communicate with other agencies/personnel and coordinate actions. The rescueraccountability challenges are also magnified; with search parameters so large, it is imperative that company officers achieve control at the company level and communicate developments as often as necessary through a well-defined communications relay system.
- Tools are an important aspect of search-and-rescue effectiveness. Firefighters must have the necessary tools before ascending the stairs —the 50th floor is not the place to remember the hydraulic door opener. Doors and elevators had to be forced, walls had to be breached, etc.
- Assess medical needs early in the incident. Establish a forward triage
- area, if possible, which w ill allow for a prioritized patient-assessment and removal process.
- Rescuing people through an elevator cab roof is performed only under extraordinary circumstances, such as those of the WTC incident. If power is restored to a stalled elevator involved in such an evacuation, such as that which occurred during the evacuation of the cabful of schoolchildren, rescuers and trapped occupants are placed in an extremely dangerous position.
All elevator cabs have an “on top of car inspection switch” as well as an emergency stop button on top of the car, which will keep the cab from moving if power is restored. These switches/buttons should be activated if rescues are conducted through the top of the cab. Activation of these switches/buttons will not, however, prevent a cab from being moved manually from the elevator machine room.
