BY DONALD R. ADAMS SR.
At approximately 0645 hours on Monday, February 2, 2004, an 8,800-gallon gasoline tanker carrying an unknown amount of product overturned on Interstate 75 southbound near Exit 182 (Sumter Boulevard) in North Port, Florida. I-75 is the major artery connecting Tampa and Miami; Sumter Boulevard is the main road into North Port. At 0649 hours, the North Port Fire Rescue District was dispatched to an overturned tanker with fire and explosions on I-75 south of Sumter Boulevard. The district responded an engine, a rescue, and Battalion 8 from Station 81 along with an engine from Station 82.
Battalion 8 was the first unit in the area and reported that nothing was visible in the area of dispatch. On the morning of the incident, a heavy sea fog reduced line-of-sight visibility to between 10 and 50 feet. Battalion 8 reported no other traffic on I-75 southbound and advised all units that the incident was north of the Sumter Boulevard exit. Engine 81 and Rescue 83 had already committed to a southbound response and could not turn around. These units would have to turn around at the Toledo Blade exit, three miles south of Sumter Boulevard. Battalion 8, Engine 81, and Rescue 83 then encountered heavy traffic northbound. Poor visibility, combined with early morning commuter traffic, impeded the response of Station 81 units.
Dispatch sent out an administrative page for the chief officers of the district to respond. Engine 82 and both North Port Fire Rescue deputy chiefs responded to the location north of Sumter Boulevard exit in the southbound lane. Deputy Chief Howard Bearse and I arrived at approximately the same time with Bearse arriving south of the incident and I north of it. Engine 82 had to respond north of the incident to turn around at mile marker 184. Command reported a fully involved tanker fire with unknown occupants and issued an emergency callback for all off-duty firefighters.
The tanker crashed in a construction zone on the Big Slough Bridge over the Myakkahatchee Creek. Ignition occurred as the tanker struck the guardrail leading to the bridge.
The crash blocked all southbound traffic, and fuel from the tanker was running into the creek. Bearse assumed command and requested additional units from Sarasota County and the Nokomis Volunteer Fire Department. Sarasota County Squad 8 (Hazardous Materials Unit), Sarasota County Engine 26, Nokomis Tanker, and Nokomis Engine responded to the north end of the incident, requiring them to respond against the normal flow of traffic. Engine 82 arrived on the north side of the incident. I instructed the engine to lay a supply line to start a water shuttle operation. There are no hydrants in the area.
Bearse passed command to me; he became the suppression sector chief. Command requested the response of three additional tankers and the Florida Department of Transportation. All units were to report to a Level II staging area a quarter of a mile north of the incident. All responding units had to navigate their way through heavy southbound traffic on the only road leading to the incident. Command advised that petroleum products had flowed into the Myakkahatchee Creek. Chief Bill Taaffe notified North Port Public Utilities (NPPU) of the potential impact to the environment. The creek is one of the primary sources of drinking water for the community. Crews assigned to the hazardous materials sector placed four booms in the Myakkahatchee Creek to help contain the petroleum products. NPPU also shut down the pumps at the water plant.
Heavy spalling to the top of the bridge as well as to the support columns under the bridge necessitated that command place the bridge off limits to all apparatus. The petroleum on the surface of the bridge was consumed by fire prior to arrival. Some of it remained in a small portion of the 8,800-gallon tanker, which was still intact, and in the saddle tanks.
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It was later discovered that the truck had been carrying 7,700 gallons of diesel fuel and gasoline.
Engine 82 had extended two 13/4-inch handlines from a three-inch line for a foam blanket operation while Engine 26 operated one 13/4-inch line in operation with foam for the initial attack. Both engines were supplied by a “nursemaid” operation. The fire’s thermal column kept the crews from reaching all areas of the fire effectively. The initial attack was made using nozzles with foam. Suppression crews were not making any headway, so the operation was shut down. Minutes later, the hazardous materials unit arrived on-scene with a foam eductor. Command also established a rapid intervention team and staging, safety, haz-mat, fire suppression, rehab, and public information sectors.
At 0753 hours, fire suppression crews had knocked down the fire. The hazardous materials sector operated until 1310 hours. Suppression crews continued to reapply a foam blanket until a cleanup company removed the remaining product.
The truck driver was the only fatality in the incident.
LESSONS LEARNED
- Preplanning. Well-developed incident command and hazardous materials operation contributed to the successful outcome. The required resources had been identified as a result of a previous tanker incident. However, traffic congestion and fog conditions impeded response time.
- Traffic control. Since the accident occurred during morning rush hour, it did not allow local and state law enforcement to divert traffic to alternate routes. These were established late in the incident. Significant traffic problems occurred on Interstate 75 and the secondary corridor, U.S. Route 41. The location and type of incident made congestion unavoidable.
- Haz-mat response. At known fuel spills or fuel fires, a hazardous materials unit should be part of the initial response.
- Water supply. In addition to the initial response, all confirmed tanker fires on interstate highways should include a response of at least three tankers for a water supply. There were no hydrants in the area.
- Foam application. In this incident, we used only 15 gallons of AFF foam. The area is nonhydranted, and mutual-aid tanker response can take up to 45 minutes. By the time the water and foam were available, most of the involved fuel had burned off.
- Scene security. Establish scene security quickly. The media, construction workers, and other bystanders had access to the hazard zone.
DONALD R. ADAMS SR. is the deputy chief of administration for the North Port (FL) Fire Rescue District and a 29-year veteran of the fire service. Previously, he served as chief of Osceola County (FL) Emergency Services and spent 25 years with the Orlando (FL) Fire Department. He received a master’s degree in education and a bachelor’s degree in business from National-Louis University. Adams is a graduate of the National Fire Academy’s Executive Fire Officer Program.
