INITIAL APPARATUS PLACEMENT AND A KEEN EYE prevented what would have been a major loss for the Clark County (NV) Fire Department (CCFD) and the Las Vegas Fire & Rescue Department (LVF&R). February 17, 2007, will remain in the minds of responding firefighters as the day that almost changed their lives.
THE STRUCTURE: A HOUSE OF CARDS
The fire began about 1600 hours in a commercial area that had been vacated and was scheduled for demolition to make way for a high-rise condominium project. This older structure, approximately 12,000 square feet, was built using precast walls, cast on the floor slab at the building site. These walls are then raised into their location and braced in place until the roofing system is attached. This older type of “tilt-slab” construction relies on steel imbedded into the foundation slab and walls along with the roof structure to attach and anchor the structure together.1 This type of building, because of seismic considerations, has undergone improvements in construction technology, which makes it somewhat safer. However, determining one type of tilt-up construction from the other is not easy, even during preplanning. Regardless of how these buildings are erected, this type of construction is still a major concern for firefighters.
MULTIPLE CALLS
Multiple calls came in to the fire alarm office at 1611 hours as “black smoke showing from a building.” The initial assignment included Engines (E) 15, 18, and 218; Truck (T) 18, Rescue (R) 15, and Battalion (B) 2. First-due E15 requested an additional engine company based on the notes on the mobile computer terminal and the presence of smoke in that general direction. E5 from LVF&R was assigned (automatic aid) along with a mobile air unit. Vagrants frequented these structures, a fact that was relayed to the alarm office from the former property owner.
Captain Chris Grimes arrived on E15 and established “Scripps Command,” describing the structure as a “large vacant warehouse” with heavy black smoke coming from the rear doors (C side). The fire was declared a working fire, and Heavy Rescue 21 was requested. The only exposures were similar buildings to the north and west, neither of which was threatened.
R15 was assigned forcible entry, which was started on the A side overhead door, to get a better picture of the fire. Shortly after E15’s arrival, the fire began to show signs of rapid progression. Smoke was now coming from the southwest corner (A-D side). Grimes requested a second alarm that was to include E5 (already en route). E21, E12, and E10; T11; R218; and B1 from LVF&R were assigned. The EMS coordinator and public information officer also responded.
The fire was progressing incredibly fast and was now starting to show from the roof. Because of this rapid progression, a defensive operation was declared. E18 arrived and was assigned to the West Division (A Side), along with E15’s crew and R15. Soon, E5 would join them. Command requested that incoming units keep the front area open for the first-due truck. E218 arrived and was assigned to the East Division (C side). T18 arrived and was assigned to the West Division to prepare for a defensive water tower operation. The fire continued to progress rapidly; operations hurried to catch up.
Battalion Chief Kenneth Morgan arrived and conducted a rapid assessment of the fire, met with Grimes, and then assumed command, keeping Grimes at the command post for assistance. Access by the East Division was delayed, as it had to force through fencing to gain access. East Division requested a truck company. T11 was assigned. The fire was growing rapidly; however, units were beginning to operate, and it appeared that they were beginning to make some headway.
SUDDEN COLLAPSE
As this operation continued, West Division, commanded by Captain Jim Ortiz from E18, continued operations, which included forcing the overhead door to gain an advantage on the fire. Fire was now showing heavily through the roof, and T18’s tower was preparing for operation. Firefighter Kevin Irwin, acting as the engineer on E15, spotted something that would remind everyone at this fire about the hazards of this job. He noticed a bow in the north (B side) wall. He immediately notified Walsh from T18, who initiated emergency traffic on the radio advising all personnel to clear away from the building. Within seconds of this broadcast, the roof collapsed, pulling the north wall down into the structure. This initial collapse was less than 15 minutes from the time of alarm. It made a resounding thud as it crashed inward. A personnel accountability report (PAR) was immediately requested from each division; East Division responded that it had a PAR.
Within seconds of the first collapse, part of the west wall also collapsed (photo 1), falling outward where seconds before the West Division had been operating. This west wall had the overhead door that was being forced (photo 2). The crew evacuated the area rapidly, leaving the hoseline and saw behind (photo 3). Personnel were horror-struck at the command area when it appeared that some firefighters might have been struck by this secondary collapse. PARs were again requested; thankfully, all personnel were accounted for.
null
 (2) The overhead door that was being forced can be seen next to the firefighters standing on the fallen wall. |
null
 (3) The companies operating here made a hasty retreat, abandoning their hoseline. The saw was later recovered under the roll-up door. |
Operations regrouped; the fire was controlled shortly after. Safety officers were assigned to each division to monitor progress and the remainder of the building. Prior to any further operations, command, division commanders, and the deputy chief of operations surveyed the structure to determine the best way to overhaul this fire. The remainder of this operation was completed without incident.
LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED
- Crew resource management is a fairly new tool to the fire service. The airline industry and the military have used it successfully for years, and it has reduced human errors in critical judgment that had plagued them. In this instance, it very well may have saved the lives of several personnel. Crews must be trained to remain observant and to bring concerns up to company officers and division leaders. There is some resistance to this type of management; many company officers do not like being second-guessed. If this reluctance is addressed before the need for crew resource management arises, the issues can be resolved. This management tool provides the leader with more eyes and brainpower relative to the situation. This is essential where safety is concerned.
- Broadcasting a good initial size-up puts incoming crews into the proper mindset for operations. This size-up report needs to be brief but complete. Report format can be outlined by department standard operating procedures or by good sound training. By making initial operational requests known early, operations will flow better and be safer.
- Our policy on emergency traffic states that anyone with a genuine safety concern can initiate this procedure. Local policies must ensure that this option is available to personnel and that the policy is revisited regularly to ensure rapid implementation when needed.
- Initially positioning apparatus for safety is essential. If you establish collapse zones early as apparatus arrive, you will not have to reposition apparatus (photo 4). It is much easier to stretch additional hose than to dig out your rig. The recommended 1 1/2 times the height of the building may not be enough. The importance of being familiar with the occupancies in your first-due area and their potential for collapsing cannot be overstated.
(4) When positioning apparatus, you must consider the potential for collapse of the structure. The general rule of 1 1/2 times the building height may not be enough to ensure safety.
- Tilt-slab (tilt-up) construction is dangerous in our view, because it relies on intact building components for stability. Generally speaking, wall sections that are attached to the roofing systems usually fall inward as the roof system fails and the trusses pull the sections in. Walls that run parallel or are not attached to the roofing system are a 50/50 guess at best. Never expect these wall panels to fall inward! Three connector plates, all of which failed, attached each of this structure’s parallel wall sections to the slab. Three similar connector plates on each side connected one wall’s section to its adjoining sections. Several of these connections were pulled completely from the point in which they were embedded in the wall section (photo 5). Detailed prefire inspections may not uncover the hidden weaknesses found in this type of building (photo 6). Any fire in a tilt-up building presents a collapse potential from the onset. This building collapsed in less than 15 minutes, and it involved minimal live-fire loading. The fuel was primarily the building structure in the form of the roofing system, which consisted of wood composite I-beams, sheeting, and general roof-finishing materials.
null
(6) This corroded anchor plate was found during a postfire inspection.
- Defensive means defensive. Once a defensive operation has been declared, any operations within the collapse zone must be based on a risk-vs.-gain assessment. Remember, when you go defensive, you have written off the building and its contents. You must be very careful when operating near a structure that is being fought in a defensive posture. This incident has reinforced the cliché “Expect the unexpected.” Firefighters like putting water on fire-not on buildings-but if the gain is not worth the risk, and it rarely is, wait for the fire to come to you.
- Safety officers must be assigned as soon as practical. Incident commanders are responsible for overall incident safety. They rely on the eyes and decisions of division leaders, who are responsible for safety within their division. They rely on the company officers to give them information. This continues down the hierarchy. If there is any indication of an unusual hazard or if the incident becomes too complex, ensure that one individual has the responsibility for safety and only safety (photo 7). Do not hesitate to assign a safety officer to each division as the incident dictates. Remember, any safety officer who has to enter a compromised area must have a partner (each must watch each other’s back).
(7) Suppression efforts continue under the watchful eye of West Division safety (B1, LVF&R). This wall remained in a compromised position for the remainder of the operation.
- Any operation, immediately dangerous to life or health or not, that has a potential to trap or confine fire personnel should have a rapid intervention team (RIT) assigned. Larger fires with limited access or a large fireground may necessitate that a RIT be assigned to each division. This is the most indispensable assignment on the fireground.
- Accountability at a fire scene is not an option. Whether you are the incident commander or division/group leader, know where your personnel are-ALWAYS. In larger incidents, assign someone to this task. Ensure that someone from your RIT is tracking, participating, or is aware of the accountability.
Basic firefighting operations along with some good heads-up observation and appropriate reactions prevented a disaster at this fire. We all know the risks of this job, and we accept those risks. What we cannot accept is complacency or tunnel vision at any fire. There is no such thing as a routine fire. Practice safe operations at all fires (collapse zones, accountability, safety officers, and so on) small or large so that when the big one comes, you will be prepared.
Endnote
1. For more on this type of construction, see “Hazards of Precast Concrete Wall Panels,” Gregory Havel, Fire Engineering, December 2006, 75.
KENNETH MORGAN, a 25-year veteran of the fire service, has spent the past 19 years with the Clark County (NV) Fire Department, where he is a battalion chief assigned to Battalion 2, which protects the Las Vegas Strip. He has a master’s degree in public administration, is a fire officer VI, and has completed two years of the four-year Executive Fire Officer’s Program.
CHRISTIAN GRIMES, a 13-year veteran of the fire service, has served the past three years as a captain assigned to Clark County (NV) Fire Department Engine 15, in the Chinatown section.
