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| (1) Members of the Ocean County Office of Emergency Management (OEM), the Toms River OEM, and the NJ-TF1 swift water component looking at access to the barrier island. This view is looking east from the base of the Route 37 bridge connecting the mainland with Pelican Island and Seaside Heights across Barnegat Bay. (Photos by Len Dotson, NJ-TF1.) |
BY ART BLOOMER
After the “near miss” of Hurricane Irene in the late summer of 2011, New Jersey first responders took a harder look at dealing with disasters of such magnitude. Most of the state’s emergency personnel had never really experienced storms of this type. So even though we had ample warning for Sandy, no one had any inkling that the devastation would be even a small fraction of what it was. Many nor’easters have come through the state, causing major flooding; tremendous property damage; and, far too often, loss of life. Many agencies reacted by developing a response protocol and the resources to handle the problems encountered. Researching past events, they identified problem flooding areas and formulated plans to rescue and relocate civilians affected.
Sadly, many communities not affected by these floods over the past decades failed to envision how their response areas would be affected. Not that they totally ignored the problem, but developing the response units to handle these types of flooding issues is costly, and it’s hard to persuade those providing the funding that you need water rescue capabilities in communities without even a single body of water. So, alternatively, many other communities looked to existing resources and set up mutual-aid agreements. Unfortunately, during Sandy, most of these resources were too busy in their own communities.
Sandy lasted several days out at sea, developing from a tropical storm to a Category 1 and then to a Category 2 hurricane and then was just barely downgraded to a Category 1 on landfall. Coupled with this, making Sandy a “superstorm,” was that an additional stormfront was involved that resembled a nor’easter. No one was really sure exactly what was going to happen; we knew only what the weather experts told us: to expect major coastal flooding along with winds up to 75 miles per hour (mph). Moreover, the storm would make landfall at high tide during a full moon.
Geologically, New Jersey’s barrier islands are basically sand, unlike the Florida Keys, which are islands comprised of sand on top of either coral or limestone, and most structures sit on a solid base. But with New Jersey’s barrier islands, the ocean and bay will go wherever they want to. Residents in the Florida Keys are familiar with hurricanes, know what to expect, and know how to prepare for them, whereas New Jersey has not experienced a hurricane making landfall for several decades.
The Jersey Shore has seen a tremendous amount of development since the last hurricane came through decades ago. Emergency services spent days running all the templates: what would definitely flood, what would probably flood, what structures would be somewhat affected by the wind, and what structures would quite possibly collapse in the high winds and flooding. Many shore communities had little, if any, special operations capabilities (e.g., swift water rescue, building collapse rescue). Many had boats and dive teams, but they would quite possibly be of little to no use during the height of the storm. It wasn’t too long before agencies that did provide special operations response were asked, “What can we expect from your agency when we call you?”
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| (2) In Ortley Beach, these homes were swept off their foundations and were heavily damaged by the storm surge; many were moved blocks from their original locations. Approximately 50 structures are still unaccounted for; they were either swept out to sea or into the bay. |
Fortunately, New Jersey has been very proactive over the past decade or so in ensuring that specialized rescue units would be ready, trained, and equipped to do the job required in an emergency. The state had organized its own statewide urban search and rescue team (US&R), New Jersey Task Force 1 (NJ-TF1), in the late 1990s. NJ-TF1 has more than 200 members trained in all aspects of specialized rescue. Although not presently a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) team, it is comparably set up and equipped. A large component within NJ-TF1 can respond to swift water incidents. Also, in recent years, a network of county-based units has been established that operates within the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program. Such teams are comprised of members of career fire departments in the urban area near New York City and are set up as smaller US&R-capable teams. They would normally respond before NJ-TF1 to start rescue operations.
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| (3) Members of the NJ-TF1 swift water component making their way north on Route 35 in Ortley Beach. |
The state also has a very strong network of localized technical rescue teams, operating out of individual or county-based fire departments. Most members of these teams have been trained to the same standards, using the same equipment, enabling these teams to seamlessly integrate and operate as one unit if needed.
PREPARATIONS BEFORE THE STORM
NJ-TF1 started preparations almost the week before the storm. Members were paged to determine their availability for deployment and responded days before landfall to ensure that all equipment was ready to deploy. To assist state response, FEMA staged its US&R teams from Ohio and Virginia at Joint Base Maguire-Dix-Lakehurst, the area deemed to potentially be the most affected. Members of a Level 1 Incident Support Team were sent to New Jersey to help support operations.
Locally, the counties that had oceanfront communities notified the task force leaders of the county and local teams to determine their response capabilities. As was done with NJ-TF1, equipment was checked and readied for response. In the early preparatory stages, there was still not enough advance information that would make the agencies preparing aware that flooding, not the collapse of structures, would be the primary issue. Many of the teams prepared mainly for structural collapse rescue, staging lumber caches in areas for quick access if needed. In Ocean County, the Regional Urban Strike Team, comprised of the technical rescue teams from Brick Township, Toms River Township, and Berkeley Township, coordinated the distribution of their response units to where landfall was expected to enable a rapid response. Units in other oceanfront counties also did the same. Technical rescue units from the Neptune and Asbury Park fire departments were also put on alert, as were units farther south in Atlantic and Cape May counties. The UASI units located to the north also coordinated and prepared for a more anticipated storm surge and wind event. All of the state’s US&R assets were on high alert in the hours preceding landfall. All operations would be coordinated out of the New Jersey’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
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| (4, 5) In Brick Township, these structures suffered heavy damage from the storm surge. |
LANDFALL
Once Sandy made landfall, events much worse than anticipated transpired. Although high winds were experienced statewide and caused a significant amount of damage, the storm surge was the biggest challenge during the storm and in the following weeks. As expected, Ocean and Monmouth counties took a heavy hit from the storm surge, and abnormally high tides only made matters worse. Emergency dispatch centers started receiving calls from many frantic civilians trapped in their houses on Ocean County’s barrier islands. Unfortunately, although ordered to evacuate, many residents chose to ride out the storm, based on their experience of last year’s Hurricane Irene and previous storms. The biggest problem was that at the height of the storm, most first responders had response restrictions. To ensure their safety, many units were not allowed to respond initially during the high winds and extremely high tides. Although this may not seem to be the best response policy, it no doubt saved many first responders’ lives. They would have been at extreme risk attempting to reach trapped civilians. The storm reached its height during the early to late evening hours, and responding in the darker hours would have added to the extreme risk. Many agencies started to send out units to attempt rescue as soon as it was deemed safer, but most of these rescue units were met with astounding conditions.
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| (6) One of the more than 30 structures that burned in the Camp Osborn section of Brick Township on the barrier island. Occurring during the height of the storm, these fires were suspected to be caused by gas leaks. Fire units were unable to access the barrier island because of the flooding and washed-out roads. |
The extent of the storm surge damage was unanticipated. Sections of the barrier islands were under eight to 12 feet of water throughout Ocean County, and conditions were similar in low-lying areas in Monmouth, Atlantic, and Cape May counties. In northern Ocean County, the Atlantic Ocean had blown right through the town of Mantoloking in at least three locations into Barnegat Bay, depositing tremendous amounts of sand and debris. Anything that was not tied down-houses, cars, boats-was swept away. Access onto the barrier island was nonexistent since the bridge from Brick Township into Mantoloking was made impassable. The surge had created a new inlet right by the bridge’s base, where it also deposited several houses it had carried blocks from their original locations. As emergency response units started to respond, radio report after radio report came in saying that the units were unable to even get close to their destinations. There were dozens of reports of civilians trapped in flooded and collapsing structures, and there was no way to approach them.
As day broke the next morning, the devastation became all too obvious. As units observed from the mainland and formulated plans to access the barrier islands for rescue, more and more calls came in for assistance. Swift water response was the foremost resource needed; these units faced problems with the water currents. Normally trained in dealing with currents running in one direction, they initially faced flood waters affected by tidal currents. The currents were constantly changing; some were affected by the ocean’s wave action. The swift water teams needed to develop a safe approach to the barrier islands. By midday, the tides started receding somewhat, and units were able to access forward locations to attempt rescues. But these units confronted incoming tides and had to abandon some of the forward positions. Over the next few days, swift water rescue units from NJ-TF1, local special operations teams, local fire departments, and law enforcement boat units made thousands of rescues. Helicopters from multiple agencies including the New Jersey State Police, the New Jersey Forestry Service, the United States Coast Guard, and other government agencies aided in locating potential victims. NJ-TF1 alone made more than 1,000 rescues of flood-stranded victims.
As the flood waters receded, a new problem arose: Many barrier island residents were unaccounted for. It was not fully known if these residents were still trapped and in need of rescue or medical assistance. As water rescues were being made, special operations units on scene were organized into search groups and were assigned zones and quadrants in which to do house-to-house searches for still unaccounted for residents. In Ocean County, NJ-TF1 members combined with Ocean County Regional Urban Strike Team members and other responders to do these door-to-door searches.
They encountered a large amount of devastation. The surge had moved anything that was not securely attached, including structures. Rescuers soon realized that some of the structures that they had been assigned to search were in fact missing. They were finding houses where none were supposed to be. In one place, two structures with the same house numbers were side by side collapsed onto each other; one house had drifted from five blocks away.
Special operations search teams worked for most of the week to ensure that each structure was searched and classified for stability. Each structure was marked using the FEMA marking system, and the data were recorded at local EOCs. It was a daunting task, but eventually all the residents were accounted for, and thousands of structures were searched. Initial search and rescue operations lasted from October 28 through November 2. Support operations are still ongoing in many communities, especially those in the harder hit areas of Ocean County. Many of the damaged residences are still in place, awaiting final insurance settlement, leaving hazards for the local technical rescue teams to address. It will be many long months until all of the debris is cleared.
Of the many lessons learned by the special operations units from this storm is to expect the worst and prepare for the future. The Jersey Shore was devastated by a storm of the magnitude that it has not experienced in recent history; emergency response units need to consider this when planning for the future.
● ART BLOOMER is a 30-plus-year veteran of the fire service and a firefighter with the Kearny (NJ) Fire Department, where he is assigned to Tower 2 and Squad 2. He is a NJ-certified level II fire instructor at the Ocean County Fire Academy, teaching truck, rapid intervention, and special operations. He is a rescue specialist on NJ-TF1. He is a past chief of the Brick Township (NJ) Fire Department, where he is head of the technical rescue team. He is a regular classroom and Hands-On Training instructor at FDIC.
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