The Politics of Incident Management

The Politics of Incident Management

The past decade has seen the emergency response community place a tremendous emphasis on incident management and the incident command system (ICS). Numerous articles, textbooks, and training programs have emphasized the need for improved management structure for safely and effectively managing problems and resources in an emergency situation. As a result, emergencies today appear to be managed much better than they were 10 years ago.

Field experience has shown that there are two parallel sides to incident management—technical and political. Technical issues include the establishment of command, the creation of operational sectors, and the like, while the political aspects primarily pertain to the interpersonal and organizational dynamics of incident management. In most situations, we do a pretty good job managing the technical issues associated with the emergency but often tend to neglect or downplay the “political” aspects of incident management.

This article discusses the “political” aspects of incident management. It is based on lessons learned by responders while managing hazardous-materials emergencies and is designed to support the information provided in incident command training programs. Many of the issues raised here are not necessarily new or unique, but experience has shown that they commonly are overlooked by many command officers. Emphasis is on the interpersonal and organizational dynamics that occur at emergencies, including problems and options that can be used by the incident commander and command staff.

POLITICS: A DEFINITION

First, what do we mean by the term “politics”? Traditionally, politics has been associated with the administration and management of governmental organizations. To many, it is a bad word. However, in this article, politics is associated with administering and managing an incident command system, with particular emphasis on organizational dynamics, conflict, compromise, and communications.

Politics is a reality. It is inherent in everything we do in any type of organization. As a command officer, you must factor it into your decisionmaking equations. It is rather naive to think or wish that there would be no political considerations to deal with during the management of an emergency.

Obviously, the best time to address many of these political and organizational issues is during the planning phase. For the purposes of this article, we will review these issues in terms of a preincident, incident response, and post incident timeline.

PREINCIDENT ISSUES AND CONCERNS

Planning concerns—compliance es. operations. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (SARA Title III) and OSH A 1910.120, Hazardous Wastes (operations and Emergency Response regulations have focused much attention on the need for community planning and the implementation of an incident command system. Many communities and industries that previously had done very little emergency response planning now were required to develop planning documents to meet preestablished regulatory criteria. Unfortunately, the result often has been emergency response plans (ERPs) that look good on paper but don’t really work on the street. In the rush to create ERPs that meet the letter of the law, many organizations have lost sight of the importance of the operational utility of their ERP.

In some cases, more emphasis has been placed on “Do we meet the requirements of the law?” than on “Do we meet the requirements of the law, and can our personnel perform the duties that we expect?” In fact, the overall national performance of industrial and public safety planning programs could be summarized as follows: I’he majority of industrial emergency response programs are “compliance-oriented”—the letter of the law is satisfied, but the performance of facility emergency responders often is suspect.

In contrast, most public safety emergency response programs are “operationally oriented”—personnel are able to perform the expected emergency response tasks but often lack the required regulatory documentation.

Planning and preparedness activities establish a framework for how the emergency response effort will function. While ERPs must satisfy minimum regulatory requirements, it is critical that the ERP be operationally oriented and representative of actual personnel and resource capabilities. ERPs that are not user friendly do not get used.

Organizational relationships. A question that traditionally has created heated discussions is, “Who is in charge?” This is particularly true when dealing with hazardous-materials emergencies along major traffic corridors and in major industrial facilities.

Hazardous-materials emergencies require the resources of a variety of organizations or “players.” All organizations with a haz-mat emergency response mission bring their own agendas to the emergency scene. Each of these organizational agendas represents real, valid, and significant concerns. Problems often are created, however, when there is no communication prior to the emergency (i.e., you don’t know the key players and their emergency response missions), and everyone feels that their specific agendas or interests are the most important. Remember, the ability to mount a safe and effective response builds on what is accomplished during planning and preparedness activities.

In many instances, perceptions can be as bad as, if not worse than, actual facts. Perceptions often are based on our experiences with one individual or incident. If that experience was positive, we tend to view the respective organization in a positive light until proven otherwise. Similarly, if that experience was negative..you know the rest.

There is no single agency in the public or private sector that can effectively manage a major emergency alone. At a minimum, a major haz-mat emergency requires resources and expertise beyond that of the fire service. There is no excuse for not knowing who the key agency players in your area are and with whom you are going to interface on a regular basis or at major emergencies.

Organizational growth and maturity. All organizations go through a growth and maturing process. The best example in the emergency response community is the recognition and growth of emergency medical services into a third public safety service during the 1970s and 1980s. In many respects, hazardous materials has followed this same growth and maturing process.

Emergency response organizations can be categorized as “people-dependent” or “system-dependent.” Many emergency response organizations with specialized activities, such as haz mat or specialized rescue teams, are very “people-dependent.” These organizations rely almost totally on the experience of a few key individuals. People-oriented systems often result in failed emergency response efforts if these key individuals are not present at an incident.

In contrast, a “system-dependent” organization is one in which the objectives of the emergency response program are clearly defined, specific duties and responsibilities are spelled out in standard operating procedures (SOPs) and operational checklists, and available resources are listed. A system-dependent response allows individuals to assume different roles in an emergency regardless of their daily activities. Written procedures, operational checklists, and an effective training and critique program ensure that less-experienced personnel can get the job done safely and efficiently.

Most hazardous-materials response teams started out as “people-dependent” operations. In essence, as long as the right shift was working or the “key” three or four people responded, the incident went well. If these key personnel were not present, overall incident safety and effectiveness were somewhat suspect. Virtually all of us have experienced this at some point during our careers.

In contrast, a “system-dependent organization” delivers a consistent level of quality and service regardless of personnel or location. For example, when you order a Big Mac from any McDonald’s throughout the world, there is little difference in quality or taste. How do they do it several billion times in a row? Simple, by emphasizing procedures and personnel training. In short, McDonald’s is the epitome of a “system-dependent” organization.

An organizational philosophy and management goal of each emergency response program should be to develop operational procedures that will bring consistency to emergency operations. The components of this system include the following:

• Developing standard operating procedures.
• Training all personnel in the scope, application, and implementation of the SOPs.
• Executing the SOPs on the emergency scene.
• Postincident reviewing and critiquing of the operational effectiveness.
• Revising and updating SOPs.

This standard management cycle

helps build an organization with the ability to “self-improve” over time.

Of course, having procedures alone is not sufficient, as the procedures must reflect the ability to handle not only the major emergency but also the day-to-day operations. Many organizations prepare for the “big one” but still can’t handle the everyday occurrence. If you don’t have your act together on the day-to-day operations, you are not going to pull it out of your hat for a major emergency. The routine establishes the basics on which the nonroutine must build. The more routine decisions made prior to the incident, the more time the incident commander will have to make critical decisions during the emergency.

INCIDENT ISSUES AND CONCERNS

A number of internal and external factors can influence the safe and effective management of a haz-mat emergency. They include the following:

Leadership ami command presence. The issue of who is the primary agency in charge is not to be determined at the emergency scene. However, even when resolved during the planning process, command can be usurped or taken away in situations where there is not a strong command presence or the incident commander is not effective.

The initial phases of emergency management are often 75 percent presentation or “looks” and 25 percent knowledge. Leadership is as important as control. A good friend mentioned to me that the best officers he had been involved with during his fire service career had one thing in common: Their presence was so strong that it inspired people to perform on the emergency scene. If you look like you know what you are doing, it sets a “tone” for the management of the emergency. Many refer to this as “command presence.”

At many haz-mat emergencies, it takes time to gather the necessary information required to establish specific strategic objectives. It is essential to keep the “troops” at bay during this time period, as the potential for injury and harm is extremely high. If command presence is not strong, freelancing often results.

The political officer. At most major incidents, the incident commander is faced with a multitude of technical, managerial, and political issues. Incidents that are effectively managed from technical and managerial perspectives can be perceived as poorly managed by the public and outside agencies because the political issues associated with the incident are not adequately addressed.

The incident command system is an effective vehicle for ensuring that command addresses the technical and political facets of an emergency. A key member of the command staff is the liaison officer. The liaison officer actually is the “political officer” and serves as the point of contact for all assisting and cooperating agency representatives, allowing the incident commander and the command staff to focus on problem resolution while ensuring that political sensitivities still are addressed. The liaison officer’s ability to effectively coordinate, handle, and “stroke” individual agencies and their representatives will have a substantial impact on how the incident is perceived from a political perspective.

“What yon see is not necessarily what yon get. ” Underestimating the significance of a haz-mat problem can increase the level of risk to responders and the public. However, consistently overreacting to a haz-mat problem can damage the credibility of the response organization, internally and externally. For example, fire service personnel can relate to the company officer who consistently screams for a box alarm assignment, only to learn that the heavy smoke condition was caused by food on the stove.

The absence of physical indicators of a hazard—smoke, vapors, odors— influences public and political perception of an emergency. If a visible physical indicator points to a haz-mat problem, fewer questions typically are asked by the public and governmental/elected officials regarding certain decisions made by emergency responders.

The duration of the incident is also an influencing factor, even in the presence of a physical indicator. For example, landfill and tire fires that burn for an extended period of time usually lead to the public’s tolerance disappearing by day two. Public intolerance is directly proportional to the amount of time the public is inconvenienced.

Technical specialists and information sources. When gathering information, remember that firefighters are the true nonbelievers. They have been lied to so many times that they automatically do not believe what they are told. This is not necessarily a bad trait, as long as responders have a structured procedure to guide them through the information-gathering process. In many respects, the role of responders during this process is similar to that of a detective.

A likely source of hazard information is personnel who work with the chemical(s) or their processing or who have some specialized knowledge related to areas such as container design, toxicology, or chemistry. When evaluating these “specialists” and the information they provide, consider these factors:

• Many individuals who are specialists in a narrow, specific technical area may not have an understanding of the broad, multidisciplined nature of haz-mat response. Some information sources can provide extensive data on container design, for example, but may be unfamiliar with basic site safety and personal protective clothing practices.
• There are some technical specialists whose knowledge is based on dealing with a chemical or process in a structured and controlled environment. When faced with the same chemical or process in an uncontrolled or emergency response situation, they may provide only limited information.
• There are no experts, only information sources. Each source has advantages and limitations. A friend who responded to the Persian Gulf oil spill during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 provided this response after being referred to as an expert: “We aren’t experts, but we do have good judgment. Recognize, however, that good judgment is based on experience, and experience is often the product of bad judgment.”
• You often interact with individuals with whom you have had no previous contact. Before relying on their recommendations, ascertain their level of expertise and job classification by asking specific questions. Remember these two points: Technical smarts is not equivalent to street smarts—having an alphabet behind one’s name does not automatically mean that an individual necessarily understands the world of emergency
• response and operations in a field setting—and 20 years of experience actually may be one year of experience repeated 20 times.
• Questioning these information sources is an art and requires the skills of a detective and a diplomat. While this certainly is not an interrogation process, you must be confident of the source’s expertise and authority. One method is to ask questions for which you already know the answers, to evaluate that person’s competency and knowledge level. Remember, final accountability rests with the incident commander.

Finally, remember that since everybody brings their own agendas and scorecards to the emergency, don’t assume that their concerns are going to be the same as your concerns.

Hazard and risk assessment. Hazard and risk assessment is the cornerstone of decision making and is directly tied to the establishment of response objectives. Unfortunately, while many haz-mat training programs stress the gathering of hazard information, they fail to adequately address the concept of assessing the level of risk. Emergency responders often have been injured because they did not understand, or they underestimated, the level of risk associated with the incident. In their efforts to do something, responders often became part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

Historically, emergency responders have adopted, often blindly, the philosophy of “acceptance of risk.” Simply stated, in their classic role of protecting lives and property, responders accept totally unreasonable risks where the potential of injury and harm is overwhelming compared with the probability of making things better. The net results of this “acceptance of risk” are situations where injuries and loss of life exceed the cost of damage resulting from the incident.

The incident commander must be able to distinguish between assumptions and facts. He/she is undeniably responsible for the entire operation and the welfare of everyone involved. If command is unsure or uncomfortable with any part of the plan or information received, operations should be put “on hold” until the IC is satisfied. In short, the incident commander should become a risk evaluator, not a risk taker.

Decision-making issues. Three types of decision making are commonly used in the emergency response community:

• Autocratic—generally used on the fireground. Essentially, the incident commander gives commands that are implemented with little question or feedback. This method gets the best results in fire and rescue situations where there are tremendous time constraints.
• Bureaucratic— particularly common to incident cleanup and recovery operations, as well as hazardous substance removal and remedial activities. In this case, political, governmental, and administrative influences kick
• in and do not allow for quick or rapid decisions. Some also have referred to this as “decision paralysis.” Remember, you cannot micromanage a major hazardous-materials incident.
• Democratic—common to special operations, such as haz-mat response teams and bomb squads. With this type, the incident timeline usually allows for more discussions at the tactical and strategic levels. This also would be similar to consolidated action planning, one of the primary tenets of the incident command system.

While the final decision always rests with the incident commander, it should be based on input from the entire command staff. Solicit opinions and ideas, as they foster individual and organizational “buy-in” into the decision-making process. Allow everyone (through their sector officers) to voice opinions, particularly when dealing with situations where the hazards are exceptionally high.

Never say never, particularly when dealing with a long-term operation. History is full of incidents that show that tactical opinions appearing totally unrealistic on day one eventually looked good and were implemented on day three.

Consider the art of communication. Remember that effective communication is one part talking and 10 parts listening. Beware of individuals whose hearing is affected by promotion as well as the “yes men” who show up at major emergencies and often flock around the incident commander.

Finally, when an incident goes bad or is particularly politically sensitive, expect to be the scapegoat. To minimize political vulnerability, the incident commander continuously must consult and build a consensus on tactical action plans, document all information, and not assume anything. A time-tested method for minimizing political vulnerability at haz-mat emergencies is the “rule of threes”: When faced with significant or politically sensitive decisions, consult at least three independent reference sources. The more politically sensitive the incident, the greater the need for the reference sources to be respected and reputable individuals.

Liability. There have been emergencies where responders have suffered from decision paralysis. Liability concerns either stopped them from or strongly influenced them in making certain decisions. These liability issues appear to be more prevalent during the cleanup and recovery phase of an incident.

While command officers certainly must be cognizant of the legal implications of their decision making, this is an issue that should be addressed during the planning phase. Accept the basic premise that at some point during your career as a command officer you are likely to be sued or questioned for your decisions. In many cases, these accusations will be politically or financially motivated and totally lack any technical foundation. The key, therefore, is to minimize the potential for a successful suit. Remember—consult, document, and do not assume.

“Everybody has the answer to your problem. ” Hazardous-materials emergencies typically attract a great deal of public attention. They also bring a number of entrepreneurs, salesmen, and “do gooders” to the attention of the incident commander, all of them professing to have the answers to your problems.

These people can be a major distraction to the incident commander, particularly at campaign, or long-duration, emergencies or if they have the ear of a local political or government official. The incident commander may have to designate an individual to seriously address these external contacts, as they occasionally do provide worthwhile information or resources. At the least, failure to seriously address these people can generate bad publicity and political backlash at budget time.

The eternal optimists. Be aware of eternal optimists within your own ranks. Don’t allow your own people to “suck you in” while they are engaged in control and mitigation operations. Initial observations often underestimate the significance of a problem. When asking for progress reports, don’t continuously ask “yes” or “no” questions. If you ask only if everything is okay, don’t be surprised when your people consistently say it is. Likewise, “…just a few more minutes and we’ll have the leak sealed” is not an acceptable response to a “Clear-the-hotzone” decision.

The incident commander and the safety officer have a unique view of the incident that many of the other players do not. Remember the difference between “street smarts” and “technical smarts”—you don’t need a degree in chemistry to know when something just doesn’t look right.

Media relations and risk communication. Media relations are an integral element of incident management and political management. Recognize that media representatives are going to get a story with or without your assistance, and it is better for you (as the incident commander) to provide that information rather than Harry Homeowner down the street. If you doubt these statements, simply think back to Operation Desert Storm and the number of media representatives who risked personal harm to travel alone into enemy territory to get their stories.

With the advent of SARA Title III and community right-to-know legislation, the concept of risk communication has taken on greater importance to governmental and industrial organizations. For example, many risk communication texts cite that the general public tends to overestimate the risks associated with the catastrophic-type hazardous-materials event (such as a Bhopal-type scenario) and underestimates the risks associated with the more common, routine-type events. That is an important point when you consider that more than 50 percent of all hazardousmaterials incidents involve flammable liquids. Unfortunately, experience also has shown that risk communication with the general public often becomes an emotional issue rather than a factual one.

The issue of organizational credibility also has received increased attention. For example, a number of studies have asked the public who they trust as sources of information about chemical risks, with emphasis on the qualities of credibility and expertise. Among the lessons learned is that local government officials, including emergency responders, generally are perceived to be low on expertise but high on trustworthiness. Other “trustworthy” information sources include physicians, environmental groups, news reporters, and local emergency planning committees. In contrast, industrial and other government officials generally are perceived to be high on expertise but low on trustworthiness. In managing media relations and responding to risk communication concerns, the incident commander should remember the following points:

• From the public’s perspective, the media are the messengers and perceptions are reality. If the public perceives that an incident is being well-managed, its perceptions of emergency responders and their efforts are positive. Of course, the reverse also is true! Consider, for example. how emergency responders may be perceived by the public when they initiate major traffic shutdowns or public evacuations as a result of a hazardous-materials emergency where there is no physical indicator of a problem (smoke, fire, odors).
• Emergencies are your opportunity to market your skills, capabilities, and resource requirements to the public (your market). In reality, it is free advertising!
• In his textbook Fire Command, Alan Hrunacini notes the following tactical truth: “The incident commander must be careful of what he says and how he acts in difficult situations. Offhanded, dumb command comments are like aluminum beer cans—they last forever in the environment.”

POSTINCIDENT ISSUES AND CONCERNS

Hazardous-materials incidents typically are long, mentally demanding emergencies. When the emergency finally is stabilized, most responders want to go home—period! Unfortunately, there are postincident political issues that the incident commander still must address.

Enforcement issues. Recent state and federal laws, including SARA Title III and revisions to the Clean Air Act, have provided greater enforcement powers to state and local public safety and environmental personnel. Essentially, the costs of making mistakes have gone up dramatically! As command officers, start thinking about enforcement issues as early in the incident as possible. For example, at a highway incident where the carrier’s shipping papers are not correct, consider calling in state highway enforcement personnel as soon as possible. Likewise, if dealing with an illegal dumping incident, notify the state environmental crimes unit, as your local incident actually may be part of a larger, regional dumping problem.

Of course, if you recognize early on that you have a potential enforcement scenario, don’t “tip your hand.” There is a great deal of information that emergency responders routinely gather as part of their hazard and risk analysis process that subsequently can be used for criminal and civil litigation on behalf of the community or the organization you represent.

Opportunities. The history of rules and regulations in the United States traditionally has been based on people making mistakes. Unfortunately, major incidents often are tragedies for the public and emergency responders. Yet. major incidents also represent opportunities not only for resources but also for legislative and regulatory action. One fire service colleague refers to this as “crisis diplomacy.”

People and organizations often are referred to as being lucky. Perhaps, but luck is also where preparation meets opportunity. A good command officer always has a “wish list” or a “pet project” position paper in the top desk drawer awaiting that right opportunity.

Lessons learned. Postincident debriefing sessions and critiques are an integral part of developing a “systemdependent” emergency response organization. Keep in mind that while you can fool the spectators, you can’t fool the players. To a large degree, critiques mirror the personality of the critique facilitator. This is an important element to consider when selecting a facilitator for a “high-profile” or politically sensitive operation.

Careful planning and consideration are required to make the critique process effective and accepted. Experience shows that there are three types of critiques: Responders lie to each other about what a great job they did; responders yell at each other for messing up; and responders focus on lessons learned, emphasizing changes or improvements that need to be made in SOPs, resources, and training so that the same errors are not repeated. Obviously, the third type is preferred.

Finally, always be a student. Organizations and individuals often state that they cannot share their experiences with respect to a specific incident because of legal implications or their attorney’s advice. You certainly can understand the rationale for such statements. However, as emergency responders, you could argue that it is equally unethical, immoral, and perhaps even criminal to have experiences and not share the lessons learned with peers in the emergency response community. Sharing lessons often can be done behind the scenes via informal networking.

The incident commander’s final grade will be based on a combination of technical, managerial, and political factors. Incidents effectively managed from the technical and managerial perspectives still can be perceived as poorly managed by the public and outside agencies because the political issues associated with the incidents are not adequately addressed